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RITCHIE (sex offender) 
Cert to P~ Ct. (McDermott; 
Larsen, Hutchinson, diss.) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that the State Supreme Court 
erred in holding that the ~onfrontation Clause required the trial 
court to grant defense coun:el access to ~ child~we~fa;~ agency•Sl 
~ 'r ~ _::_.) 
file on the juvenile complainant. 
~ 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp was convicted of raping / I 
his 12-year-old daughter Jeanette. The incident giving rise to 
c_-pcz 'w(eye. -to (J~-r 
M~k 
- 2 -
the charges occured in June 1979, but Jeane~te testified that her 
father had abused her over a period of four years. Before trial, 
defense counsel served a subpoena on Pennsylvania's Child Welfare 
Services (CWS), seeking records pertaining to Jeanette. CWS had 
evidently interviewed and examined the child in September 1978, 
following a report of child abuse from an unidentified source. 
CWS claimed its records were confidential and refused to produce 
them. Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law provides that 
reports made pursuant to the statute shall be confidential, but ......... ~ 
shall be made available to certain officials and groups, including 
courts of competent jurisdiction pursuant to court order. 11 Pa. 
Stat.§ 2215(a)(5). 
At a pretrial conference, defense counsel moved for sanctions 
and argued that he should be allowed access to the files because 
they might contain evidence useful in impeaching or discrediting 
the daughter, or they might reveal potential witnesses. 
reviewed the records in camera and found "that no medical records 
are being held by the Child Welfare Services that would be of 
benefit to the defendant in this case." The motion for sanctions 
was accordingly denied. 
Following his conviction, resp argued on appeal that his 
counsel should have been permitted to review the files, or that, 
at a minimum, counsel should have been allowed access to any ver-
batim records of statements made by Jeanette. The Superior Court 
concluded that resp's Sixth Amendment confrontation right entitled 
him to inspect "any portion of CWS' files which reflects state-





examined her." Petn App 44a. The case was . remanded for the TC to 
determine in camera whether the records contained any such state-
ments, and, if so, whether the court's failure to provide resp 
with the statements prior to trial was harmless error. In addi-
tion, the Superior Court ordered the TC to allow defense counse 
access to all of the files "in order to argue the relevance of the 
material in accordance with this decision. Counsel, of course, 
are permitted access to this record for this purpose only and are 
otherwise bound by the confidential nature of the material in the 
record."" Petn App 46a. 
The Pa. Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the 
State could not accord victims "absolute protections that cancel 
the fundamental mandates of [the Sixth] Amendment; all that can be 
accomplished is a careful balance between them, the counters al-
ways in favor of the Amendment." Petn App Sa. Construing the 
Child Protective Services Law in light of that principle, the 
court concluded 
that the trial court erred in refusing appellee access 
to the CWS files. As in Davis [v. Alaska, 415 u.s. 308 
(1974)], we find that the Commonwealth's interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of these records may not 
override a defendant's right to effectively confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses against him •... [I]t would 
be absurd to read the statute as providing that the 
records be made available to a court of competent juris-
diction, while denying any use of them to the litigants 
in a criminal case before such courts. Notwithstanding 
the trial court's "finding" that the files contained 
nothing that would benefit appellee, it is apparent that 
appellee was denied the opportunity to have the files 
reviewed with the eyes and the perspective of an advo-
cate. Neither the confidentiality provision of the 
Child Protective Services Law nor any other argument yet 
advanced justifies that denial. 
Petn App 12a. (In Davis, this Court held that the Confrontation 
- 4 -
I 
Clause was violated when a defendant charged with burglary was 
prevented from questioning the State's principal witness regarding 
the witness' juvenile burglary record and probationary status.) 
The case was remanded to the TC with instructions that defense 
counsel "be granted access to the CWS files" in order "to argue to 
the trial court what use, if any, could have been made of the 
files in cross-examining the complainant or in presenting other 
evidence." Id. , at 12a----t3a-. 
Jus(ice --;::,rsen dissent;>in an opinion joined by 
...... ----
Justice 
Hutchinson. The dissenters charged that, "[i] n allowing counse 
on remand to scour the entire [CWS] 
( ov\UiV\ c.~ Y\tf 
file relating to the young ~~c,Stt'\t' cr 
victim in this case on no more than the flimsiest assertion that 
he might find some matters or witnesses that would be helpful to 
appellee, the majority has licensed a fishing expedition. Since 
any defense attorney in~ criminal prosecution can always assert 
that that there may be some matters that could be helpful to the 
accused, the majority's decision today does not just undermine the 
confidentiality of child protective service agency files, it elim-
inates it whenever a case against an accused child abuser is pros-
ecuted." Petn App lSa. Davis was distinguishable, because in 
that case "the defendant's need and request for the information 
sought was specific and would have been quite valuable to the 
defendant in helping to establish his defense, to demonstrate the 
witness' motivation for testifying and possibly lying, and to cast 
the witness as a possible suspect in the burglary." Id., at 28a-
29a. 
Justice Larsen would allow defense counsel in this case ac-
- 5 -
I 
cess only to any verbatim records of Jeanette's statements, and 
,../ 
not even to those if the TC determined that they fell within Penn-
sylvania's statutory privilege for confidential communications to 
sexual assault counselors, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5945.1. 
Justice Hutchinson would instruct the TC to consider the applica-
tion of that statutory privilege "as affected by" the Confronta-
tion Clause. See Petn App 3la-34a. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The decision below was based exclusively on 
federal cosntitutional grounds and impermissibly expands the prin-
ciples announced in Davis v. Alaska. . Davis authorized only a 
limited foray into privileged information, based on defense coun-
sel' s narrowly tailored proffer and a careful balancing of the 
conflicting interests. Counsel in Davis disclaimed any intent to 
attack the general character of the State's witness; he proposed 
instead to explore the witness' possible motivation to testify 
falsely. In this case, however, unrestricted access to privileged 
files was granted based solely on defense counsel's vague specula-
tion the files might contain matters favorable to the defendant. 
Allowing such "fishing expeditions" will severely hamper law en-
forcement by discouraging family members and friends who wish to 
remain anonymous from reporting child abuse. It is unrealistic to 
expect that anonymity will be long preserved after information is 
disclosed to defense counsel. 
Furthermore, the decision below conflicts '"i th Cami tsch v. 
Risley, 705 F.2d 351 (CA9 1983), and with State v. Storlazzi, 191 
Conn. 453, 464 A. 2d 829 (1983). In Cami tsch, th~he ld that 




erwi se confidential case files of every juvenile witness. 
The bare allegation that it is impossible to tell how defense 
counsel might have been able to use the various information •.. is 
insufficient to support a finding of constitutional error in deny-
ing access." 705 F.2d, at 353-354. In Storlazzi, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court affirmed the TC's refusal to allow the defense ac-
cess to psychiatric and social agency records of the victim, be-
cause in camera review of the records "failed to disclose material 
especially probative ••• so as to justify breaching their confi-
dent ial i ty in disclosing them to the d-efendant." 464 A.2d, at 
833. 
4. DISCUSSION: This is indeed from Davis. It 
is one thing to say that the Confrontation Clause requires that a 
criminal defendant be permitted to question a juvenile witness 
concerning confidential matters that could well do "[s]erious 
damage to the strength of the State's case," 415 U.S., at 319~ it 
is a very different thing to say that defense counsel must be 
Al 
to confidential files regarding a ------" granted unrestricted access juvenile witness merely because it is always possible that the 
trial judge was wrong in concluding that nothing in the files 
would help the defendant. 
Moreover, petr is correct that the decision below is in sig-
nificant tension with Camitsch and with Storlazzi. Like Davis, 
Camitsch concerned the delinquency record of juvenile witnesses, 
not the files of a child welfare agency. But it is hard to see 
why that difference should matter~ in either case, the defendant's 
interest in obtaining possibly helpful information conflicts with 
- 7 -
I 
the interest of the State and the juvenLle in keeping certain 
, 
potentially embarrassing information confidential. The CA9 held 
in Camitsch that the Constitution was not violated when defense 
counsel was not allowed access to various reports and evaluations 
in the delinquency files of juvenile witnesses for the prosecu-
tion. As in this case, the trial judge had examined the files and 
determined that they contained nothing affecting the competency or 
credibility of the witnesses. 
Storlazzi concerned records of psychiatric and social agen-
cies. Unlike the CA9, the Connecticut Supreme Court was not con-
tent to rely on the trial judge's determination that the records 
contained no information that would be helpful to defense. In-
stead of simply ordering the records disclosed to defense counsel, 
however, the court examined them itself, and concluded that the 
trial judge had been correct, and therefore that there had been 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
Although the decision below technically rested on the inter-
pretation of state statutory law, that interpretation was express-
ly guided by the Pa. Supreme Court's understanding of what the 
Sixth Amendment requires. See Petn App 6a, lla-12a. It is possi-
ble that the State Supreme Court will back down if the Pennsylva-
nia legislature amends the statute to forbid unambiguously the 
sort of disclosure ordered in this case. Justice Larsen suggested 
just such a possibility in his dissent by urging "the legislature 
to act swiftly to shore up the confidentiality provisions that 
have been substantially discarded by the majority today." Petn 
App 33a. But the importance of the question decided by the Penn-
., 
- 8 -
sylvania Supreme Court, together with the ,relatively sharp con-
flict this decision creates with decisions of th'"e ~ )the 
Supreme Court of suggest that cert may well be appro-
priate. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend calling for a response. 
There is no response. 
March 23, 1986 Sklansky opn in petn 
T • 
. \ 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: No. 85-1347-csy Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 
Date: May 21, 1986 
This case is set for discussion at Conference tomorrow. 
The response is in. I have read it and am convinced that the 
case merits a grant. 
Resp raped his daughter. His lawyer sought confidential 
,...._______ - ·-·--·--
information from the Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services 
regarding earlier reports made concerning his abuse of her to the 
agency. His motion to compel access to the reports was denied on 
the basis of a state statute, the Child Protective Services Law, ----which provided that such information would be confidential. The 
~ examined the material in camera and c~n~~d t~ 
they contained nothing that would be helpful to the defense. ~The 
----------·--------·---~
Penn. S.Ct. held that the denial of access to the records 
-- ~ 
violated the Confrontation Clause, and interpreted the state 
statute in a way that limited its cloak of confidentiality so as 
not to prohibit access to such files by defense attorneys. From 
that interpretation of the state statue, based entirely on the 
Penn. S.Ct.'s reading of this Court's Confrontation Clause cases, 
the state petitions for cert. 
Cert. is proper under 28 u.s.c. §1257(3). Resp's 
-------- ---
distinctions of the relevant cases are entirely unpersuasive. In 
particular, the argument that the cases somehow depend on when 
··, 
', 
the confidential report was prepared is without merit. This case 
, 
involves a significant expansion of the rule in Davis v. Alaska, 
415 u.s. 308 (1974), and conflicts with the decisions of courts 
~-=--~ 




Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . Announced ............... . 1 19 .. . 
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ABSENT NOT VOTING 
lfp/ss 10/29/86 RITCHIE SALLY-POW 
85-1347 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This case presents a question under the 
"confrontation clause" of the Sixth Amendment. Responde~ 
Ritchie was tried and convicted of "rape, incest and 
corruption of minors", and sentenced to a prison term. 
The charges were based on alleged sexual abuse by 
respondent of his 12/13 year old daughter. -Prior to trial, defense counsel served a subpoena 
on the Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services CCWS), seeking 
access to all of its records pertaining to the daughter 
(Jeannette). Pennsylvania, like all 50 states, provides 
offices available 24 hours a day to receive complaints and 
reports of child abuse. According to various briefs, such 
- --- --- -----· -· ------........ 
abuse is widespread in our country. CWS maintains records 
of these reports, and of interviews and examinations of 
alleged victims. As noted above, defense counsel - prior 
to trial - sought by subpoena to examine all reports and 
records pertaining to Jeannette. Under Pennsylvania law 
these records are "confidential", but may be made 
,. ~ 
'lr . ' '· 
available to courts and certain other officials pursuant 
to court order. 
The TC, after reviewing the records in camera, 
found no records, medical or otherwise, that in the 
court's opinion would be helpful to the defendant. The 
motion accordingly was denied. 
/ 
On appeal the Superior Court reversed and ordered 
a new trial. It concluded that defense counsel should 
have access to all of the files, and that this was 
necessary "in order to [enable counsel] to argue the 
relevance of the material". The Superior Court stated 
that it was permitting this access to the entire record 
only for the purpose of identifying what may be relevant • 
./ 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. It 
undertook to ~ the obviou~tate interest in 
protecting the confidentiality of sensitive information of 
this kind against t~nstitutional right of a defendant 
in criminal court to confront witnesses. This includes 
the right to obtain evidence in the possession of the 
state that may facilitate cross examination, identify 
possible witnesses, and generally facilitate defense of 
the accused. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied 
particularly on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, a 
. ,. 
confrontation clause case that can be distinguished 
because there the issue arose during trial and was limited 
to specific needs. Here, by contrast, defense counsel 
will have access in advance of trial to examine all 
records pertaining to Jeannette. Three Justices of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court dissented. 
The rationale of the court's decision is well 
summarized in the next to the last paragraph of its 
opinion. Pet. for Cert. 12 (a). In essence, the court 
concluded that despite the state's interest in maintaining 
confidentiality of these records, this "may not override a 
defendant's right to effectively confront and cross 
examine the witnesses against him." Defense counsel 
cannot be "denied the opportunity to have the file 
reviewed with the eyes and the prospective of ~ 
advocate". 
Justice Larsen, dissenting, recognized that the 
confidentiality of these records is "not absolute" under 
the Pennsylvania legislation. There are exceptions, 
including when a court orders disclosure. Justice Lars~ 
reviewed the record of the trial and concluded that the 
defense was not handicapped by the trial court's denial of 
---------- ------




subjected to "vigorous and extensive cross examination". 
A review of that cross examination "demonstrates that it 
was broad and unrestricted". The dissenting judge 
concluded that it would be "difficult to imagine ... how 
appellee's rights to confront adverse witnesses • were 
in any way infringed". The state's rights also were 
described as "compelling". 
The dissenting judges as well as the amici 
briefs on behalf of a number of other states - emphasized 
the importance of preserving "the confidentiality of Child 
Protective Service files". See the last paragraph in 
Justice Larsen's dissent (joined by Justice Hutchinson). 
This emphasizes that absent confidentiality, parents and 
others will not be able to assure "young victims" that the 
--~ I 
information they give the agency in confidence will not be 
----------------------------~--~ ~ 
"scrutinized by their abusers". Nor will the 
---- --
confidentiality of the identity of those reporting child 
abuse - a critical factor to the success of the Child 
Protective Services law - be guaranteed. Parents, friends 
and others who suspect or witness child abuse will be less 
inclined to report it, if it is likely that their identifY 




I have not mentioned any of the cases except 




nature of the state interest 
and the importance of preserving 
generally are well recognized. Equally 
well recognized is the basic component of our law that a 
defendant is entitled to confront witnesses against him or 
her. 
Perhaps we made a mistake in taking this case, 
as in the end these cases probably will be decided on a 
"fact specific" basis. I do think the one discrete issue, 
t:erhaps not easily described, is whether prior to trial, 
defense counsel may be accorded the right to examine the 
entire confidential file on his or her accuser. In most 
cases a good trial court could examine the record in 
camera - possibly with counsel for both sides present -
and identify what if anything properly may be made 
available to defense counsel. 
As I fully understand the facts, the issue, and 
the interest of the state, a summary bench memo suggesting 
the appropriate analysis would be helpful. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM ,a_-/-~" 
Andy 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, No. 85-1~ 
Oral Argument: Wednesday December 5, 1986 
Cert. to the Pa. s. Ct. (McDermott, Larsen [dis], Hutchinson 
[dis]) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
This case involves a state statute that protects the .... ....... 
£1 ,, 
confidentiality of child protective service records. A de-
fendant charged with rape and incest sought access to 
records containing information about the alleged victim. 
The question presented is whether and to what extent ~he 6th 
amendment requires that the defendant be given access to 
these records. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Respondent George Ritchie was charged with sexually 
molesting his 12 year old daughter over a 4 year period. In 
preparing for trial, resp learned that the victim had spoken 
with Child Welfare Services CCWS), a state agency designed 
to protect and counsel children who suffer from abuse. Re-
spondent served a subpoena on CWS, seeking access to any 
--~
information "pertaining" to the victim. CWS refused to com-
ply, claiming that its records were privileged under state 
law. The Pennsylvania statute then in effectl provided that 
---~ 
all information given to CWS concerning incidents of child 
abuse is confidential. -- The rule was subject to 11 excep- !but__ tions, one of which was that the agency could disclose the ~~ 
reports to "a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a~~ 
~
court order." 11 P.S. S2215Ca) CS): See Petr Brief at 3. ~ ~ ~ 
Respondent moved to compel production. At a pre-trial 
hearing, Ritchie argued that the CWS file might contain the 
names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified 
information that could prove exculpatory. In addition, resp 
1 The statute subsequently was amended to broaden the number of 
people who had access to the information. See Cert Petn at 7a n. 
12. 
claimed that a doctor had examined the victim on behalf of 
I 
CWS, and that the medical report also should be disc~losed. 
A CWS representative who attended the hearing claimed that 
there was no medical report in the agency records. Then in 
a somewhat confusing order, the trial judge determined that ~ 
~ere was no relevant medical report, and that resp was not 
entitled to access to the CWS information. See Cert Petn at 
2a-3a. 
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his ~)._~ 
daughter. -- Defense counsel engaged in vigorous cross-~ examination of the victim, questioning her on all aspects of~~ 
the alleged abuse. Ritchie was convicted by a jury, and the 
judge sentenced him to 9 to 18 years. 
On appeal to the state superior court, resp alleged 
that the failure to disclose the cws file violated both the 
confrontation clause and the compulsory process clause of 
the 6th amendment. The court agreed, vacated the convic-
tion, and remanded for further proceedings. The court did ~~ 
_ hoid4hat the Ent~ filji} must be disclosed immediately, ~Uj 
Instead, it fashioned a remedy whereby the trial
judge first would examine the records in camera, and would 
disclose any verbatim statements made by the victim to a CWS 
counselor. Then respondent's lawyer would be allowed to 
inspect the entire record, to determine if there was any 
other information that would have assisted the defense. The 
prosecution should be present at these proceedings, said the 
court, to argue that the relevant information (if any) was 
,, ,_ 
immaterial, and that thus the failure to disclose was harm-, 
less. Finally, if the trial judge concluded that th~ error 
was prejudicial, resp was to be given a new trial. See Cert 
Petn 45a-46a. 
The Pa. S. Ct. affirmed, finding that the confidential-
ity provision in the state statute was insufficient to over-
come the defendant's 6th amendment rights. The state court 
was unpersuaded by the tc "finding" that there was no rele-
vant information in the file; the constitutional infirmity, 
said the court, was that resp was denied the opportunity to 
have the information ·reviewed by an advocate, rather than by 
a neutral judge. Id., at 12a. The court agreed that de-
fense counsel must be given the opportunity on remand to 
~ustice Larsen dissented. First, he said that resp had 
not made any showing of need for the evidence. Second, he 
said there was no 6th amendment violation because there had 
been no restriction on defendant's ability to cross-exam the 
victim at trial. Finally, the dissent was "distress[ed]" at 
the effect the court's decision on the state's ability to 
protect abused children. Id., at 32a. 






The main question in this case is whether resp should q 
be ~ ~_Ecc~s~to the CWS records. Before the 
Court reaches that issue, however, it must consider 
··' 
·-
Ritchie's allegation that the case should be dismis1'3ed 
lack of jurisdiction. 
for~~ 
A. Not A Final Decision 
Resp~ a threshold 
1._ -
risdiction because the Pa. 
claim that the Court has no ju-
S. Ct. did not render a final 
decision on the merits. See 28 u.s.c. §1257. He argues 
that there are several procedural steps that must occur be-
fore the rights of the parties become final: the tc must 
examine the record in camera, must determine which informa-
tion should have been disclosed, and must determine whether 
the failure was harmless error. If there was an error and 
it was prejudicial, the case then would proceed to trial. 
Resp points out that the case could be moot at any of these 
stages, and that therefore the decision of the Pa. S. Ct. 
was interlocutory. 
Ritchie also asserts that the interests underlying the 
finality doctrine would be best served by waiting for fur-
_/ 
ther proceedings. Not only will it preserve judicial re-
sources if Ritchie's claim becomes moot, it also will pre-
vent the Court from conducting piecemeal review. Resp notes 
that if the tc concludes that he is not entitled to a new 
trial, there will be 2 federal issues for appeal: the 6th 
amendment issue concerning access to the file, plus the 
question of whether the failure to disclose other informa-
tion was harmless error. Resp Brief at 11. Ritchie there-
fore concludes that the Court should "DIG" the case until 




over the records; or, b) the tc decides that a new trial is 
warranted. Resp Brief at 19. 
Even though the case may become moot on remand, I think 
it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction to reach the 
merits now. The Court has recognized several exceptions to 
the traditional finality doctrine, at least one of which 
seems to apply here. 
I 
4 
420 u.s. 469 (1975), the Court outlined 
appeals l where jurisdiction is proper even though --
the decision below is not technically final. One category -is where "later review of the federal question cannot be 
had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case." Id., at 
481. In the case at bar, the nature of the later proceed-
ings will make it difficult or impossible for petr to pre-
serve the 6th amendment issue. If the tc determines that 
there was no error in the failure to disclose Cor that the 
error was harmless), Ritchie's conviction will be reinstat-
ed. Because it prevailed, the State obviously could not 
take an appeal; at best it could cross-appeal on this point 
should resp challenge his conviction. There is no guarantee 
that resp would take his appeal to this Court, however, and 
thus petr would be precluded from obtaining review of the 
state court's 6th amendment ruling. 
On the other hand, if the tc determines that there 
should be a new trial, the State still might be unable to 
challenge the decision below. If resp is acquitted, the 
case is terminated; if resp is convicted, then once again 
the State will have to preserve this issue in cross-appeals. 
See New York v. Quarles 467 U.S. 649, 651 n. 1 (1984) '. (pre-
trial decision to suppress evidence "final" for purposes of 
review since state will be barred from pressing claim by 
either mootness or double jeopardy). 
Two other facts point toward considering the case now. 
First, there is little danger of piecemeal litigation, be-
cause it is unlikely that the Court would be interested in 
considering resp' s "other" federal issue: whether it was 
harmless error to withhold particular parts of the CWS file. 
Second, the harm alleged by the State will occur regardless 
of what happens on remand. The danger the State is trying 
to prevent is disclosure of confidential information. Be-
cause there has been a final decision on this point, consid-
eration by the Court seems proper • 
. The Me~ 
two substantive questions before the Court: 
(1) was the lower court correct in finding a 6th amendment 
violation: (2) if yes, was the remedy proper? 
1. Sixth amendment violation. Although its opinion is 
somewhat murky, the Pa. S. Ct. apparently found that the 
failure to disclose the CWS file violated both the confron-
tation clause and the compulsory process clause. The 
~ 
State's first argument is that the court misconstrued the 
defendant's right to confront his accusers. Petitioner cor-
rectly notes that this right has two elements: the right to 
physically face adverse witnesses, and the right to engage 
;, .. 
in cross-examination. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 , S. Ct. 
292, 294 (1985) Cper curiam) • Since the former coridi tion 
was met by virtue of the victim testifying at trial, the 
state court must have concluded that there was an impermis-
sible restriction on resp's right to question the daughter. 
But, petr argues, here there was no restriction: the trial 
judge did not limit the scope of the questioning, and the 
record shows that counsel asked the victim about all aspects 
of the crime, including the content of her discussion with 
the the CWS counselors. App. at 47a-50a. The State notes 
that while Ritchie might have been able to conduct better 
cross-examination had the files been disclosed, the confron-
tation clause only guarantees "an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective." 
Fensterer, supra, at 295: Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.s. 56, 73 
n. 12 (1980) (except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry 
into 'effectiveness' is required"). 
Petr claims that the lower court reached the wrong re- ?~hr­
sult in part because it misconstrued Davis v. Alaska, 415 ~ 
u.s. 308 (1974). In Davis, you will recall, defense counsel 
was ordered not to question a key witness about his record 
of juvenile delinquency, because an Alaska statute made this 
information presumptively confidential. Petitioner in this 
case argues that the Court reversed the conviction in Davis 
primarily because of the restrictions placed on defense 
counsel at trial: the judge put a direct limitation on the 
types of relevant questions that defendant could ask. The 
•·. 
proper reading of Davis and its progeny, says petr, is that 
the confrontation clause is implicated only when there '' is an 
interference with defendant's trial rights. Since in this 
case Ritchie only was denied pretrial access to confidential 
material, there is no 6th amendment violation. Petr Brief 
at 15-17. See also Barber v. Page, 390 u.s. 719, 725 (1968) 
(right of confrontation is a "trial" right). 
The precedent favors the Stat~'s argument. Although I 
have not found a factually similar decision by this Court, 
the leading opinions in this area all involve a specific ----------- -----
limitation placed on the scope of questioning at the trial 
itself.2 The Court has indicated that it places some sig-
nificance on this point. Last term, for example, the Court 
considered a confrontation clause claim in Fensterer, supra. 
Defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of an ex-
pert witness, who could not remember which scientific test 
he had used to form his opinion. Although this inability to 
recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the 
testimony, this Court found no 6th amendment violation, be-
cause, inter alia, there had been no restriction on the 
right to cross-examine. The Court said that "the Confronta-
tion Clause normally is satisfied when the defense is given 
2 See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 390 u.s. 129 (1968) (d~l of 
right at trial to ask witness's real name and address); Douglas 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 Cl965) (de~l of right to cross-examine 
co-defendant); Davis, supra. Cf. ~cCray v. Illinois, 386 u.s. 
300 (1967) (no 6th amendment violation where defendant was denied 
chance to discover informant's name at pre-trial hearing). 
full and fair opportunity to probe and expose th[e) ~nfirmi­
ties [in the testimony] through cross-examination." '106 S. 
Ct., at 296. 
The best argument in response is that the Court in the 
past has suggested that there may be a constitutional inter-
est in allowing the defendant access to the pre-trial state-
ments made by witnesses. See, e.g., Dennis v. United 
States, 384 u.s. 855 (1966). Ritchie asserts that one of 
the harms he suffered is that he did not have access to the 
verbatim statements made by the main witness against him, 
and thus in effect he was denied the right to cross examine, 
even if not in practice.Y 
Although this claim is intuitively appealing, the Court ) 
rejected a similar argument in~ited States v. Bagley, 105 
s. Ct. 3375 (1985). In Bagley, as in this case, defendant 
made a pre-trial request for a witness's prior statements. 
The request was denied, and defendant claimed an abridgment 
of the right to cross examination. This Court found no vio-
lation, emphasizing again that there was no limitation at 
------------------------------------------
trial on the right to question witnesses. The Court then -
held that the failure to disclose prior statements should be 
analyzed under the due process clause, not the 6th amendment ~~~ 
(see discussion of due process claim, below). The refore it ~ ~ 
3 Note that if this were a federal criminal case, respondent 
would have a statutory right to the daughter's prior statements 
after she testified on direct examination. See 18 u.s.c. §3500. 
(Jenck's Act) 
l . ' 
does not appear that the tc committed a confrontation , clause 
violation in this case by allowing CSW to wi thhoi'd its 
records. 
Resp's second claim is that the tc violated the compul-
sory process clause. Although the Pa. s. Ct. did not make a 
separate ruling on this point, its opinion could be read to 
say that Ritchie was prevented from learning both the names 
·of favorable witnesses and all other relevant evidence that 
might be contained in the file. 
There does not seem to be any established framework for 
evaluating these claims, since the Court has not rendered 
many recent compulsory process opinions. The Court appears 
to have analyzed a request for exculpatory witnesses and 
\ 
information in part under the 6th amendment, and in part 
under the 5th/14th amendment due process clauses. 
The case law suggests the following guidelines. When a 
defendant claims that he was denied the right to have a wit-
ness testify in his favor, the Court will vacate a convic-
tion only when it appears that the witness would have given 
evidence that is "relevant and material, and ..• vital to 
the defense." Washington v. Texas, 388 u.s. 14, 16 (1967). 
Likewise when the defendant requests information that is 
necessary to his defense, an appellate court will find a due 
process violation when the information is "material" to 
either guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 458 u.s. 83 
(1963); see also Bagley, supra (access to prior statements 
of witnesses conditioned on showing of materiality). Clear-
ly the defendant's burden to make such a showing is rela-
tively low where, as here, he cannot know precisely what 
information is being withheld. United States v. Valenzula-
Bernal, 458 u.s. 858 {1982). Nevertheless, Ritchie had some 
obligation to show what evidence could be contained in the 
CWS file, or what the witnesses could have testified had 
they been called. In short, he must have done more than 
make general allegations that the CWS files "might" contain 
useful evidence. Id., at 870-871. 
It is a close call whether Ritchie made the required 
- ----;t 
showing. Resp spent most of his time at the pre-trial hear-
ing trying to obtain the CWS doctor's medical report. The 
rest of the request for information went like this: 
12. 
defense counsel: There is a possible witnesses 
available out of these reports. 
The other thing is this. 
records would disclose 
known to this defendant. 
Whether or not [the CWS] 




the court: What kind of witnesses? 
de: I don't know. Could be lots of witnesses. 1-<J~~ 
~
court: I don't know what you are asking for. 
de: There could be a defense witness disclosed by 
their records here. There could be matters in 
there that would be favorable to the defendant. 
App. GSa, 69a {incoherence in original). 
I am hard pressed to conclude that this discussion rep-
resents a showing by resp that he needed to review the file. 
There was no suggestion of who the other witnesses might be, 
or what the other matters were that might be favorable to 
Ritchie. Even the medical report seems to be of question-
~ 
able value. Ritchie presumably believes that the qoctor 's 
examination would show that the extent of the sexual' abuse 
was less than the daughter claimed. But at the time the 
girl was examined, the fear was that she had been be a ten, 
not molested: the examination took place because CWS had 
received information that the victim and her siblings were 
being physically abused. It is not clear that the medical 
exam would have revealed the occurrence vel non of incest. 
Thus on balance, it strikes me that respondent's request to 
examine the CWS file was little more than a "fishing expedi-
------------- -------------------
tion." This Court routinely has disapproved of such re-
quests in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 
u.s. 683, 700 {1974). 
I am inclined to say that there was no 6th amendment 
----------------------------------------- ~ 
violation in this case, and that therefore the Pa. S. Ct. 
decision should be reversed. Two facts suggest caution, 
however:~, I am troubled that resp might have been de-
nied access to verbatim statements made by the victim to the 
CWS counselor. This type of information could be highly 
relevant to the defense if, for example, the daughter's 
---~
trial testimony was inconsistent with the earlier state-
ments. This type of evidence might have had great impeach-
ment value, and therefore 'l perhaps should have been disclosed -----------
See Bagley, supra (impeachment evidence / 
falls w ftll"fn Brady rule). A remand for examination of the ~ --file might be appropriate on this important point. 
.· 
·--
Second, the factual record is in of 
The trial judge who considered the disclosure request was 
definitely unprepared and probably inept, 4 so it is diffi-
cult to draw any conclusions from the pre-trial hearing. It 
also is not clear that either the intermediate court or the 
Pa. S. Ct. had the disputed file before it (this may be 
worth asking counsel at oral argument}, but each decided 
that more facts were necessary before a final decision could 
~ 
be made. I therefore am hesitant to recommend that t+re 
~order that the conviction be reinstated, when it may 
be that no one in either the state or federal judiciary ever 
has reviewed this information. 
Consequently (and reluctantly), I think that a remand Jl~ ---  
is ~ry to d~~~-~-~ was in fact exculpa~~ 
tory .evidence in the file. The remaining task is to deter-
---------~ 
mine the proper procedures for disclosing the file should 
the Court agree that a remand is necessary. ~ 
2. What remedy? Petitioner argues that even if a re-
mand is required, it is not necessary to give Ritchie 1c.flc_ ~ 
(through his lawyer} access to the file. 
that at most the file should be reviewed in camera to deter-
4 The trial judge admitted that he had not read parts of the 
CWS file. App. 72 ("We [?] didn't read 50 pages or more of an 
extensive record"). The judge also admitted "I don't know a damn 
thing about this case," a point that was obvious from judge's 
earlier questions. ("Is the father the defendant in this case?"). 
Id., at 68a. Sadly, the tenor of the whole pre-trial hearing is 





mine if there is any relevant information contained therein. 
Only after it was clear that there is relevant material, 
argues petr, should the state's interest in confidentiality 
be overcome by the 6th amendment. The courts below rejected 
this option, and ruled that defense counsel must be allowed 
to review the entire file. 
I agree with petr that it is unnecessary to give de-
*::~
fense counsel access to all the material. It seems clear 
that the lower court's did not attempt to reconcile the 
state's interest in keeping the file confidential with 
Ritchie's interest in having all favorable evidence brought 
forth. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 709-710 
(recognizing that right to "every man's evidence" is subject 
to privilege claims). This remedy seems particularly dras-
tic on the facts of this case, when there is no clear alle-
gation that the disputed file contains exculpatory informa-
tion. 
15. 
It seems that the better balance of the competing in- ~~ --- --ll ,,  
terests is to trust the trial J"udge to evaluate the informa- : k 
tion in camera. -made by a witness (or if rc 
..;;....-- • 
naturally they should be disclosed. 
should disclose only that material that becomes relevant 
during the course of the trial. If, for example, a CWS 
counselor testified at trail as to the results of a CWS in-
vestigation, resp should have access to any file material 
that could be used to discredit the testimony. Should the 
judge determine that the arguments of counsel are necessary 
on a close question, he retains the discretion to request 
assistance. Nixon, supra, at 715 n. 21. If the court finds 
that none of the information is relevant, and defense coun-
sel objects, the entire file then should be sealed and sent 
to the appellate court for post-conviction review. Cf. 
We berman v. NSA, 668 F. 2d 676 (CADC 198 2) (record should be 
sealed for appeal after in camera review in FOIA case). 
To be honest, the case law does not compel such a solu-
tion As resp points out, the Court has emphasized the im-







information. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S., at 875. _/ 
1-o !) tn./'- J 
Other considerations, though, point toward allowing in cam-~~~ 
~ review only, rather than immediate disclosure.~t, 
the~s1fate's interest in confidentiality is quite high. See 
Nixon, supra, at 705-706 (higher the secrecy need, greater 
showing of need to gain access). ~nd1 the information is 
not so factually complex that the trial judge necessarily 
would benefit from the assistance of the parties. See Resp 
Brief at 42. , there simply is no evidence that such 
a broad remedy is necessary to protect resp's 6th amendment 
interests; Ritchie has not made any substant~ve allegation 
about the CWS file that could not be resolved in a more lim-
ited, in camera proceeding. 
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
Despite respondent's claims, I think that the Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this case. Although there are more 
procedures to come, under this Court's precedent it appears 
that the decision below was "final" for purposes of review. 
I am doubtful that the tc committed a 6th amendment 
violation. It appears that the Court will find a confronta-
....__ _ _ 
is a restriction on the right to conduct cross-examination 
~~~~~----~--~---------------------------
The compulsory process claim is more difficult to 
, because there is no clearly established framework 
for analysis. At: a minimum it appears that the defendant is --required to make some showing of need. While I am not con-
-----~_...--"'-__..__~ 
vinced that Ritchie made such a showing, it does seem that 
certain information that he requested may be in the file, 
and may be material. I recommend that the Court affirm the 
decision to remand, so that the tc can examine the record 
-----------------------(perhaps for the first time) to ensure that there was no 
exculpatory evidence in the CWS file. 
The Court should modify the remedy ordered by the state 
-------------
court, however, to make it clear that respondent is not en-
titled to fulJ. acc~tQ_.tluL.file. The trial judge first 
l_ ___ _.....----
-~-
should review the material in camera; he then should release 
those portions of the file that become material as the trial 
progresses. In this way the state's interest is protected 
without significantly intruding on the defendant's right to 
have favorable evidence revealed • 
. •'. 
I recommend that the decision of the Pennsylvania 
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points that might interest you: 
There is an u:s~antiated rumor that Ritchie is a 
from justice~oes this change anything? I suppose it 
will moot the case if Ritchie is never re-captured. It might be 
worth asking at oral argument whether the rumor is true. 
(2) Some clerks think that the Court should DIG this case, 
because the Pa. statute in question has been amended to broaden 
the category of people who have access to the CWS fi~e. Their __ __..._..._............ ~ 
argument is complicated (and strained), so I will not go through 
the gory details. Suffice it to say that the statutory exception -- --, 
before this Court (files may be released "pursuant to a court 
order") is still part of the amended law, and thus the case 
~- -·· w """-" 
remains a live and important controversy. I will be happy to 
draft a separate memo on this point if you think it necessary: I 
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I'm afraid I have hit a stumbling block in my efforts to 
outline the opinion in this case. Simply stated, the problem is 
that I am not sure how much we want to say about the compulsory 
process clause. There is so little case law from this Court on 
the subject I am hesitant to press forward without discussing the 
matter with you. Two concerns come immediately to mind. 
(1) To address the compulsory process claim in this case, we 
must make a threshold ruling on whether the clause is available 
~. J .le criminal defendants to assist them in discovering the 
~~~ ~ 
 identities of witnesses. We also must decide whether the CPC 
~ .... ~ 
~ requires the state to assist the defendant in uncovering other 
~ exculpatory i :;:rmation. Nothing in the 6th amendment case law 
ff'-'1 .l ~ 
(?,.1' IYf .. suggests that the clause extends this far. If we decide that 
,. ~ 
~1 these rights are incorporated in the CPC, a further problem 
-!:!.r;f arise. We will be making the 6th amendment a constitutional 
I v- / 
~~iscovery tool that would appear to be distinct from the 14th 
~-·~· 
~~- amendment requirements of Brady, Bagley, etc. This may or may 
not be a good idea (I tend to think it is not), but at a minimum 
we risk creating great confusion among the lower courts. If, on 
the other hand, we decide the CPC only preserve the right to have 
~~ ------------~--~--------~----~-----------------










r ~jt\· ·.~ 
f>~A1P.~~~ 
.. / v-r· q~(V """~~ 
necessary. There is no suggestion ~-: ~itchie had any witnesses 
that he wanted to call but did not, and the remainder of his 
request went to exculpatory evidence, not witnesses. We 
therefore would have no occasion to consider the State interest 
vv 
in its child-protective statutes, which I thought was one of the ~~~ 
1-v~~ 
primary reasons we granted cert. b <r-k 
(2) An alternative theory for deciding this case is the 14th ~~ 
amendment. We could find that the 6th amendment is not 
applicable, but that the claims for access to the file should be 
viewed in light of the defendant's right to receive exculpatory 
information from the government. See Brady. In many respects 
this would be easier, but it still would present difficulties. 
First, this is not the basis on which the case was argued, nor 
was the basis for the Conference's decision. Second, we still 
would have to say something about the CPC, because this was the 
rationale for the Pa. S. Ct. decision. If we decided that the 
6th amendment did not govern this case, we would be limiting (sub 
silentio) the compulsory process clause to the right to compel 
the production of witnesses, and the right to introduce their 
testimony. Again, I am not sure that this is a bad idea, but 
this option for deciding the case was not briefed or presented to 
the Conference. So I am reluctant to go forward, at least until 
I am sure what your position is. 
I will be happy to discuss these matters with you at your 
convenience. 
December 30, 1986 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Andy 
Re: First draft in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, No. 85-1347. 
Here is a first attempt in this case. Although I am 
reasonably satisfied, three things still trouble me. 
(1) It is too long. 
(2) I am quite concerned abotit part II, the finality 
./ L.---------; 
section. I think what has .been written is mildly persuasive, but 
~ // 
I do not think that I h~~ covered all of the bases. I 
/ 
discovered yesterday ~no thanks to the parties) that if the case 
is dismissed as non-final, and if the trial court determines that 
the failure to disclose was prejudicial, the Commonwealth has the 
right to take an immediate appeal of the new trial order itself; 
it does not have to wait until the trial is complete. See Pa. R. 
App. P. 311Ca) (5). This weakens our argument, I think, because 
it is no longer true that the 6th amendment issue inevitably will 
disappear on remand. I did not discuss this point in the draft 
because I want to give it more thought, and I did not want to 
delay giving you a draft. I would like to talk with you about 
this matter at your convenience, however. There may be trouble 
down the road. 
Also on the finality issue, I recognize that footnote 6 is 
long and, in the abstract, unnecessary. The reason I included it 




• ~. k 
f ... 
" ' '•' ~ 
'· 
... 
relying specifically on Ryan. I prefer to present our argument 
to the Court first. 
(3) I think that the opinion is not strong enough. I think 
we want to say that criminal defendants never get to see the CYS 
files under ~circumstances. Is this message clearly conveyed 
in part III(B)? 
I recognize that other parts of the draft are inadequate, 
specifically the last paragraph before the conclusion (my 
description of the state interest is bland), and footnote 14 (do 
you want a 50 state survey on other confidentiality laws?). But 
instead of continuing my incessant tinkering, I simply will await 
your changes. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85- 1347 
PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE 
F. RITCHIE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT 
[January -, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether and to what 
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investiga-
tive files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal de-
fendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover 
favorable evidence. 
I 
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth 
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with 
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect. 
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape, 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corrup-
tion of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13-
year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted 
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous 
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and 
the matter then was referred to the CYS. 
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a sub-
poena, seeking access to the records concerning the daugh-
ter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the 
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed 
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate re-
port by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were 
·-
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, 
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylva-
nia law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and 
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investiga-
tion must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific ex-
ceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may 
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pur-
suant to a court order." 11 P. S. §2215(a)(5). 
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor 
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion 
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the in-
formation because the file might contain the names of favor-
able witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evi-
dence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that 
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation. 
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not exam-
1 Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the 
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daugh-
ter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges 
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation. 
1 The statute provides in part: 
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant 
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . 
and written reports ... as well as any other information obtained, reports 
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of 
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and 
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confiden-
tial and shall only be made available to: 
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a). 
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general 
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure. 
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions. 
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials 
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a per-
son who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not 
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety. 
§2215(c). 
.. . 
~ .. ~ 
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's 
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3 
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS 
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a. 
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daugh-
ter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel 
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all as-
pects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting 
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rul-
ings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of cross-
examination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a 
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to 
ten years in prison. 
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie 
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court 
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and ac-
cordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further 
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557,472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The 
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta-
1 The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an 
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case 
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a. 
• There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given 
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its 
contents. 
5 The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the 
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation 
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory 
Process Clause) . 
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he 
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to 
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only 
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS 
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available 
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to 
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated 
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the 
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the 
trial judge determined that the lack of information was preju-
dicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at--, 
472 A. 2d, at 226. 
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and 
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary. 
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not 
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to 
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded 
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the en-
tire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When 
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the per-
son inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to ex-
amine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d., 
at --, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court con-
cluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order 
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compul-
sory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the 
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had 
examined the file and determined that it contained no rele-
• The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to 
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, includ-
ing, for example, ''fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting 
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, -, n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148, 
-, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the 
right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information." 
Ibid. 
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity 
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully de-
nied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the 
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see rele-
vance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid. 
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by 
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. --
U. S. --. We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and re-
mand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
II 
Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first 
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or 
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co. v. 
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) 
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further 
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to 
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie ar-
gues that under this standard the case is not final, because 
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsyl-
vania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review 
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether 
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could 
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the 
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these 
stages, we should decline review until these further proceed-
ings are completed. 
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the 
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we 
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which 
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
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ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions 
states that the Court may consider cases: 
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with 
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to 
come, but in which later review of the federal issue can-
not be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [l]n 
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ulti-
mately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be 
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the 
governing state law would not permit him again to pre-
sent his federal claims for review." I d., at 481. 
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard be-
cause the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this 
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceed-
ings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files 
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure 
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and 
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's 
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether de-
fense counsel should have been given access will be moot. 
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Common-
wealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue 
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court 
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie 
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's 
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition. 
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have consid-
ered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Da-
kota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983). 
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced 
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Common-
wealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court. 
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the 
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on 
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in 
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which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking 
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; Califor-
nia v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with 
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not con-
sider the constitutional claims now, it will lose the chance to 
do so in the future. 7 
7 Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971), 
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a 
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The 
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We 
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. ld., at 532. 
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid 
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties 
who face such an order have the option of making the decision ''final" sim-
ply by refusing to comply with the subpoena. 
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy 
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for 
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an inter-
est that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately ap-
pealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party 
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the signifi-
cance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceed-
ings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has 
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate 
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay, 
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue. 
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions 
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and 
judicial delay). 
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action 
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth 
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sion. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a 
subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme 
Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality will not be given effect 
on these facts. The Commonwealth's interest in obtaining immediate re-
view is obvious. On the facts of this case, we do not think the finality doc-
trine requires a new round of litigation and appellate review, simply to de-
termine whether the Commonwealth is adamant about not disclosing the 
CYS records. The interests that the finality doctrine seeks to preserve 
would be disserved by prolonging this litigation. See generally, Bradley 
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by 
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that 
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid-
the disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur re-
gardless of the result on remand. Although this consid-
eration is not dispositive, we have noted that "statutorily 
created finality requirements, should if possible, be con-
strued so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost 
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered." 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). We 
therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, and turn to the merits of the case before us. 
III 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, 
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents 
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access 
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Com-
pulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional 
provisions in turn. 
A 
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protec-
tions for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face 
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, -- U. S. --, --
(1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of 
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the 
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-of-
court statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving 
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. lnadi, 
-- U. S. -- (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by de-
nying him access to the information necessary to prepare his 
v. Richmmui School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court 
has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic approach' to the question of final-
ity") (citation omitted). 
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defense, the trial court interfered with his right of cross-
examination. 
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his 
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not 
know which types of questions would best expose the weak-
nesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed, 
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the 
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were 
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal 
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the 
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that 
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or 
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984); 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this 
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction 
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269 
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information 
that might have made cross-examination more effective un-
dermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing 
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See 
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument, 
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In 
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from ques-
tioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record, 
because a state statute made this information presumptively 
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-exami-
nation violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's 
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile 
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis 
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when 
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected 
information that might be used at trial to impeach or other-
wise undermine a witness' testimony. See-- Pa., at--, 
502 A. 2d, at 152-153. 
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the 
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a 
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Noth-
ing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of 
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right, 
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask dur~g cross-exami-
nation. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970) 
("[l]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time 
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725 
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right."). 
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not 
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any 
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfa-
vorable testimony.8 Normally the right to confront one's ac-
cusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at 
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 
at --. In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective." ld., at -- (emphasis in 
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (ex-
cept in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' 
[of cross-examination] is required"). 
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that 
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of 
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which 
• This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part Ill(B), post. We 
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only 
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial produc-
tion of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we 
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial 
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by pro-
hibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. 
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scientific test he had used to fonn his opinion. Although this 
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to dis-
credit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth 
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of 
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not 
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion in any way." -- U. S., at --. F ensterer was in full 
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Con-
frontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when 
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at 
trial on the scope of questioning. 8 
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is 
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense 
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal 
record, even though that evidence might have affected the 
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case 
was rwt that Alaska made this infonnation confidential; it 
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." 
• See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra (denial of right to cross-
examine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness); 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real 
name and address at trial); DO'U{llas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (de-
nial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court nor-
mally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted 
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause 
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's 
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's 
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is ex-
clusively a trial right . . . . It does not ... require the government to 
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce 
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.") 
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen). 
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it 
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have 
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daugh-
ter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all 
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. 
B 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the 
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts 
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the 
names of the ''witnesses in his favor," as well as other evi-
dence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis 
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is 
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory 
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in 
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to 
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the con-
fidentiality of the files. 
1 
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of 
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most cele-
brated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, 
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. 
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled 
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a 
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production 
of allegedly incriminating evidence.10 United States v. Burr, 
10 The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson 
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning 
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control. 
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited 
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its 
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108. 
... ,, .. ., 
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25 F. Cas. 30,35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the 
implications of the Burr decision for fed~ral criminal proce-
dure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in 
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 11 More re-
cently, however, the Court has articulated some of the spe-
cific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment. 
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants 
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling 
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the deter-
mination of guilt. 12 
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity 
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce excul-
patory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require 
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally 
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under 
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley,--
U. S. - (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). 
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because 
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case 
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment prece-
dents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish 
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analy-
sis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that 
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this 
11 The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an 
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932); 
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164. 
11 See, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v. 
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) 
(decision based on Due Process Clause) . 
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area than those afforded by due process; we need not decide 
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's 
claims more properly are considered by reference to due 
process. 
2 
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to 
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to 
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different termin-
ologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has 
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opin-
ion of WHITE, J.). 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any 
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's 
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor de-
fense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge ac-
knowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Com-
monwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is 
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file 
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would 
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in con-
fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have 
been useful to the defense. 
Although we recognize that the public interest in protect-
ing this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not 
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all 
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute 
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all 
,_ 
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eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. §5945.l(b) (unqualified statutory privi-
lege for communications between sexual assault counselors 
and victims). 18 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that 
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, 
including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature 
contemplated scnne use of CYS records in judicial proceed-
ings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclo-
sure in criminal prosecutions. Specifically, we conclude that 
the relevant information may be disclosed when a court of 
competent jurisdiction determines that the information is 
"material" to the defense of the accused. 
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further 
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file re-
viewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information relevant to the validity of his conviction. If it 
does, he must be given a new trial. If the records main-
tained by CYS contain no material information, or if the non-
disclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 14 
uwe express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have 
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to 
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel. 
14 The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclo-
sure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information 
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere 
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")). 
See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 869-871 
(1982). The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does 
not depend on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that 
the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a 
bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the 
nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley,- U-S.-,- (1985) 
(opinion of BLACKMUN, J .); id., at- (opinion of WHITE, J.). 
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c 
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also 
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of 
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant, 
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court ap-
parently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that 
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate 
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the 
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in 
confidentiality. We cannot agree. 
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does 
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the 
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, supra, 
at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Although 
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in 
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the ab-
sence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant 
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the 
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the 
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request 
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it 
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed. 
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpa-
tory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's atten-
tion, 15 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. De-
fense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own 
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weather-
ford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general 
15 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time 
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ... order as it 
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constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady 
does not create one."). 
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Com-
monwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial 
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies 
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that 
there are several checks on the trial court's discretion. 
First, if a defendant is aware of specific infonnation con-
tained in the file (e. g., the medical report), he is free to re-
quest it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its rele-
vance. Second, the duty to disclose is ongoing; infonnation 
that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination 
may become important as the proceedings progress, and the 
court has the obligation to release material infonnation as the 
evidence dictates. Finally, should a defendant be dissatis-
fied with the trial court's decision on the amount or types of 
disclosure, he may have the file sealed and transmitted to the 
appellate court, where a panel of judges also may conduct an 
in camera examination. This combination of safeguards is 
sufficient to protect against an unjust conviction, while still 
preserving the Commonwealth's interest in confidentiality. 
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of 
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's com-
pelling interest in protecting its child abuse infonnation. If 
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even 
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on 
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child 
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prose-
cute, in large part because there often are no witnesses ex-
cept the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt, 
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly 
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential 
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he 
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. 
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more 
• 
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willing to come forward if they know that their identities will 
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like 
all other States 16-has made a commendable effort to assure 
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS coun-
selors without fear of general disclosure. The Common-
wealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential ma-
terial had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant 
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial 
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither 
precedent nor common sense requires such a result. 
IV 
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS 
file contains information that may have changed the outcome 
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a re-
mand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows de-
fense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review 
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without de-
stroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confiden-
tiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The 
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so- ordered. 
16 All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect 
the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. See 
Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing illus-
trative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether and to what 
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investiga-
tive files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal de-
fendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover 
favorable evidence. 
I 
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth 
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with 
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect. 
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape, 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corrup-
tion of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13-
year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted 
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous 
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and 
the matter then was referred to the CYS. 
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a sub-
poena, seeking access to the records concerning the daugh-
ter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the 
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed 
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate re-
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, 
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylva-
nia law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and 
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investiga-
tion must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific ex-
ceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may 
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pur-
suant to a court order." 11 P. S. § 2215(a)(5). 
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor 
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion 
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the in-
formation because the file might contain the names of favor-
able witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evi-
dence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that 
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation. 
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not exam-
'Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the 
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daugh-
ter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges 
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation. 
2 The statute provides in part: 
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant 
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse ... 
and written reports ... as well as any other information obtained, reports 
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of 
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and 
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confiden-
tial and shall only be made available to: 
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a). 
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general 
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure. 
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions. 
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials 
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a per-
son who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not 
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety. 
§ 2215(c). 
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's 
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3 
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS 
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a. 
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daugh-
ter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel 
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all as-
pects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting 
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rul-
ings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of cross-
examination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a 
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to 
ten years in prison. 
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie 
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court 
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and ac-
cordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further 
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The 
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta-
3 The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an 
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case 
before the pretrial hearing. See id. , at 68a. 
• There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given 
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its 
contents. 
& The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the 
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor. " 
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Pointer v. Texas , 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation 
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he 
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to 
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only 
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS 
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available 
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to 
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated 
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the 
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the 
trial judge determined that the lack of informatio·n was preju-
dicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at --, 
472 A. 2d, at 226. 
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and 
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary. 
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not 
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to 
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded 
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the en-
tire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When 
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the per-
son inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to ex-
amine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d., 
at --, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court con-
cluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order 
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compul-
sory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the 
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had 
examined the file and determined that it contained no rele-
6 The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to 
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, includ-
ing, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting 
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, -, n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148, 
- , n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the 
right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information." 
Ibid. 
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity 
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully de-
nied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the 
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see rele-
vance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid. 
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by 
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. --
U. S. --. We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and re-
mand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
II 
Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first 
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or 
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R . Co. v. 
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) 
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further 
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to 
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie ar-
gues that under this standard the case is not final, because 
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsyl-
vania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review 
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether 
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could 
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the 
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these 
stages, we should decline review until these further proceed-
ings are completed. 
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the 
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we 
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which 
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
.... 
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ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions 
states that the Court may consider cases: 
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with 
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to 
come, but in which later review of the federal issue can-
not be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [I]n 
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ulti-
mately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be 
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the 
governing state law would not permit him again to pre-
sent his federal claims for review." ld., at 481. 
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard be-
cause the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this 
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceed-
ings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files 
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure 
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and 
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's 
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether de-
fense counsel should have been given access will be moot. 
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Common-
wealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue 
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court 
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie 
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's 
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition. 
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have consid-
ered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Da-
kota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983). 
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced 
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Common-
wealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court. 
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the 
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on 
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in 
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which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking 
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; Califor-
nia v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with 
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not con-
sider the constitutional claims now, it will lose the chance to 
do so in the future. 7 
7 Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971), 
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a 
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The 
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We 
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. Id., at 532. 
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid 
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties 
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" sim-
ply by refusing to comply with the subpoena. 
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy 
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for 
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an inter-
est that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately ap-
pealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party 
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the signifi-
cance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceed-
ings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has 
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate 
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay, 
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue. 
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions 
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and 
judicial delay). 
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action 
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth 
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sion. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a 
subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme 
Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality will not be given effect 
on these facts. The Commonwealth's interest in obtaining immediate re-
view is obvious. On the facts of this case, we do not think the finality doc-
trine requires a new round of litigation and appellate review, simply to de-
termine whether the Commonwealth is adamant about not disclosing the 
CYS records. The interests that the finality doctrine seeks to preserve 
would be disserved by prolonging this litigation. See generally, Bradley 
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by 
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that 
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid-
the disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur re-
gardless of the result on remand. Although this consid-
eration is not dispositive, we have noted that "statutorily 
created finality requirements, should if possible, be con-
strued so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost 
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered." 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). We 
therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, and turn to the merits of the case before us. 
III 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, 
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents 
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access 
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Com-
pulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional 
provisions in turn. 
A 
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protec-
tions for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face 
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, --U.S.--,--
(1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of 
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the 
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-of-
court statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving 
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 
-- U. S. -- (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by de-
nying him access to the information necessary to prepare his 
v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court 
has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic approach' to the question of final-
ity") (citation omitted). 
85-1347-0PINION 
PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE 9 
defense, the trial court interfered with his right of cross-
examination. 
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his 
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not 
know which types of questions would best expose the weak-
nesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed, 
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the 
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were 
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal 
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the 
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that 
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or 
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984); 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this 
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction 
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269 
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information 
that might have made cross-examination more effective un-
dermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing 
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See 
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument, 
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In 
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from ques-
tioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record, 
because a state statute made this information presumptively 
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-exami-
nation violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's 
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile 
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis 
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when 
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected 
information that might be used at trial to impeach or other-
wise undermine a witness' testimony. See -- Pa., at--, 
502 A. 2d, at 152-153. 
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the 
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a 
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Noth-
ing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of 
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right, 
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-exami-
nation. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970) 
("[I]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time 
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725 
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right."). 
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not 
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any 
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfa-
vorable testimony.8 Normally the right to confront one's ac-
cusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at 
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 
at --. In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective." Id., at -- (emphasis in 
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (ex-
cept in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' 
[of cross-examination] is required"). 
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that 
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of 
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which 
8 This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), post. We 
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only 
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial produc-
tion of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we 
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial 
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by pro-
hibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. 
See Delaware v. VanArsdall,- U. S.-,- (1986). 
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scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this 
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to dis-
credit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth 
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of 
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not 
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion in any way." -- U. S., at --. F ensterer was in full 
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Con-
frontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when 
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at 
trial on the scope of questioning. 9 
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is 
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense 
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal 
record, even though that evidence might have affected the 
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case 
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it 
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." 
9 See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra (denial of right to cross-
examine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness); 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real 
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (de-
nial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court nor-
mally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted 
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause 
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's 
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's 
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is ex-
clusively a trial right . . . . It does not . . . require the government to 
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce 
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.") 
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen). 
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it 
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have 
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daugh-
ter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all. 
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. 
B 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the 
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts 
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the 
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evi-
dence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis 
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is 
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory 
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in 
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to 
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the con-
fidentiality of the files. 
1 
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of 
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most cele-
brated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, 
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. 
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled 
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a 
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production 
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 10 United States v. Burr, 
10 The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson 
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning 
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control. 
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited 
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its 
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108. 
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25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the 
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal proce-
dure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in 
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 11 More re-
cently, however, the Court has articulated some of the spe-
cific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment. 
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants 
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling 
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the deter-
mination of guilt. 12 
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity 
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce excul-
patory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require 
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally 
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under 
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley, --
U. S.- (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because 
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case 
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment prece-
dents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish 
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analy-
sis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that 
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this 
11 The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an 
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932); 
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164. 
12 See, e. g. , Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v. 
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas , 
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) 
(decision based on Due Process Clause). 
.,.;·,. .. 
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area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide 
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's 
claims more properly are considered by reference to due 
process. 
2 
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to 
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to 
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different termin-
ologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has 
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opin-
ion ofWHITE, J.). 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any 
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's 
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor de-
fense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge ac-
knowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Com-
monwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is 
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file 
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would 
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in con-
fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have 
been useful to the defense. 
Although we recognize that the public interest in protect-
ing this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not 
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all 
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute 






PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE 15 
eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privi-
lege for communications between sexual assault counselors 
and victims). 13 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that 
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, 
including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature 
contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceed-
ings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclo-
sure in criminal prosecutions. S~ecifically, W€ conclude that 
the relevant information maY')te disclosed~hen a court of 
competent jurisdiction determines that the information is 
"material" to the defense of the accused. 
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further 
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file re-
viewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information l!ele;v nt to the validity of his conviction. If it 
does, he must be given a new trial. If the records main-
tained by CYS contain no material information, or if the non-
disclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 14 
'
8 We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have 
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to 
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel. 
14 The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclo-
sure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information 
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere 
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense . . . does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")). 
See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 869-871 
(1982). The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does 
not depend on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that 
the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a 
bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the 
nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley, -- U. S. --, -- (1985) 
(opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE, J.). 
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c 
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also 
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of 
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant, 
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court ap-
parently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that 
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate 
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the 
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in 
confidentiality. We cannot agree. 
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does 
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the 
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, supra, 
at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Although 
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in 
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States , 384 U. S. 
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the ab-
sence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant 
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the 
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the 
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request 
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it 
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed. 
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpa-
tory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's atten-
tion, 15 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. De-
fense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own 
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weather-
ford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general 
'"See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time 
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ... order as it 
deems just under the circumstances."). 
( ~). ~~ 4.-fij' 
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constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady 
does not create one."). 
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Com-
monwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial 
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies 
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that 
there we several checks 811 the trial court's discretion/ 
First, Jf a defendant is aware of specific information con-
tained in the file (e . g., the medical report), he is free t~ ("W"-4-'-"- • ~ "> · 
quest it directly from the court, and argue in favor of it8.,lr9W., 
vaaGQI. Second, the duty to disclose is ongoing; information 
that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination 
may become imP,ortant as the proceedings progress, and the 
court bas he obligation to release materia mR>rmation as the 
evidence dictates. inally, should a defendant be dissatis-
' fied with the trial court's decision on the amount or types of 
1 
disclosure, he may have the file. sealed and transmitted to the 
. appellate court, where a panel of judges also may conduct an 
in camera examination. This combination of safeguards is 
f sufficient to protect against an unjust conviction, while still 
I ,.Preserving the Commonwealth's interest in confidentiality. ) 
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of 
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's com-
pelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If 
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even 
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on 
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child 
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prose-
cute, in large part because there often are no witnesses ex-
cept the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt, 
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly 
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential 
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he 
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. 
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more 
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willing to come forward if they know that their identities will 
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like 
all other States 16-has made a commendable effort to assure 
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS coun-
selors without fear of general disclosure. The Common-
wealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential ma-
terial had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant 
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial 
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither 
precedent nor common sense requires such a result. 
IV 
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS 
file contains information that may have changed the outcome 
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a re-
mand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows de-
fense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review 
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without de-
stroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confiden-
tiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The 
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
16 All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect 
the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. See 
Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing illus-
trative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting 
Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458, 
508-512 (1978). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1347 
PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE 
F . RITCHIE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT 
[January-, 1987] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether and to what 
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investiga-
tive files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal de-
fendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover 
favorable evidence. 
I 
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth 
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with 
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect. 
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape, 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corrup-
tion of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13-
year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted 
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous 
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and 
the matter then was referred to the CYS. 
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a sub-
poena, seeking access to the records concerning the daugh-
ter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the 
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed 
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate re-
port by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were 
' .. 
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, 
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylva-
nia law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and 
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investiga-
tion must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific ex-
ceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may 
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pur-
suant to a court order." 11 P. S. § 2215(a)(5). 
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor 
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion 
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the in-
formation because the file might contain the names of favor-
able witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evi-
dence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that 
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation. 
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not exam-
1 Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the 
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daugh-
ter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges 
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation. 
2 The statute provides in part: 
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant 
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . 
and written reports .. . as well as any other information obtained, reports 
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of 
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and 
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confiden-
tial and shall only be made available to: 
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a). 
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general 
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure. 
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions. 
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials 
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a per-
son who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not 
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety. 
§ 2215(c). 
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's 
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3 
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS 
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a. 
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daugh-
ter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel 
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all as-
pects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting 
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rul-
ings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of cross-
examination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a 
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to 
ten years in prison. 
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie 
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 . The court 
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and ac-
cordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further 
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The 
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta-
3 The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an 
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case 
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a. 
'There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given 
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its 
contents. 
5 The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the 
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Pointer v. Texas , 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation 
Clause); Washington v. Texas , 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory 
Process Clause). 
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he 
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to 
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only 
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS 
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available 
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to 
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated 
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the 
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the 
trial judge determined that the lack of information was preju-
dicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at --, 
472 A. 2d, at 226. 
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and 
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary. 
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not 
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to 
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded 
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the en-
tire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When 
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the per-
son inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to ex-
amine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d., 
at --, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court con-
cluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order 
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compul-
sory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the 
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had 
examined the file and determined that it contained no rele-
6 The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to 
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, includ-
ing, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting 
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, -, n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148, 
- , n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the 
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity 
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully de-
nied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the 
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see rele-
vance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid. 
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by 
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. --
U. S. --. We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and re-
mand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
II 
Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first 
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or 
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co. v. 
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) 
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further 
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to 
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie ar-
gues that under this standard the case is not final, because 
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsyl-
vania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review 
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether 
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could 
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the 
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these 
stages, we should decline review until these further proceed-
ings are completed. 
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the 
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we 
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which 
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
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ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions 
states that the Court may consider cases: 
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with 
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to 
come, but in which later review of the federal issue can-
not be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [I]n 
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ulti-
mately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be 
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the 
governing state law would not permit him again to pre-
sent his federal claims for review." !d., at 481. 
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard be-
cause the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this 
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceed-
ings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files 
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure 
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and 
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's 
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether de-
fense counsel should have been given access will be moot. 
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Common-
wealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue 
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court 
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie 
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's 
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition. 
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have consid-
ered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649·, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Da-
kota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983). 
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced 
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Common-
wealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court. 
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the 
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on 
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in 
. ' 
85-1347-0PINION 
PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE 7 
which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking 
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; Califor-
nia v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with 
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not con-
sider the constitutio al claims now, it will lose the chance to 
~-_.....-~in the futur 7 . 
7 Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971), 
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a 
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The 
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We 
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. I d., at 532. 
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid 
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties 
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" sim-
ply by refusing to comply with the subpoena. 
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy 
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for 
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an inter-
est that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately ap-
pealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party 
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the signifi-
cance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceed-
ings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has 
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate 
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay, 
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue. 
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S. , 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions 
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and 
judicial delay). 
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action 
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth 
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sion. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a 
subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme 
Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality will not be given effect 
on these facts . The Commonwealth's interest in obtaining immediate re-
view is obvious. On the facts of this case, we do not think the finality doc-
trine requires a new round of litigation and appellate review, simply to de~ 
· r the Commonwealth iii adamant abGYt Rot;..di~.~-wt<~·""' 
OYS 1 eeel'ds '"IJ1fol interests that the finalit 
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by 
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that 
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid-
/ 
the disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur re-- . a.~ tj II -= gardless of the result on remand.y Although this consid-
~ ~ eration is not dispositive, we have noted that "statutorily 
J.fr 1. _ created finality requirements, should if possible, be con-
as 'I hJl strued so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost 
.J.~·n e J , L and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered." 
7 I~ I jtJ&fC.(~t'JI ur 1 r .[o ~~Ll' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). We 
rJl>~ 'I . if therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
• tion, and turn to the merits of the case before us. <:-----
III 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, 
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents 
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access 
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Com-
pulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional 
provisions in turn. 
A 
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protec-
tions for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face 
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, --U.S.--,--
(1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of 
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the 
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-of-
court statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving 
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 
-- U. S. -- (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by de-
nying him access to the information necessary to prepare his 
v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court 
has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic approach' to the question of final-
ity") (citation omitted). 
"JhaJ (/ ~ wW -.j; ./<F«<<r.r ~a0 ~r /)"<=?P4J' 0 -icJ'Hf~ 
~a/ /~ ~~P«cu.Rd~ ~dv~ ~cl~ ~~ 4 ~~ ~ ~ j~ 
c/__k L lv ~~ CCM(J a/~ # 
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defense, the trial court interfered with his right of cross-
examination. 
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his 
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not 
know which types of questions would best expose the weak-
nesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed, 
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the 
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were 
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal 
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the 
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that 
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or 
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984); 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this 
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction 
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269 
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information 
that might have made cross-examination more effective un-
dermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing 
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See 
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument, 
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In 
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from ques-
tioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record, 
because a state statute made this information presumptively 
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-exami-
nation violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's 
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile 
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis 
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when 
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected 
information that might be used at trial to impeach or other-
wise undermine a witness' testimony. See-- Pa., at --, 
502 A. 2d, at 152-153. 
.. 
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the 
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a 
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. N oth-
ing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of 
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right, 
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-exami-
nation. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970) 
("[I]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time 
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725 
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right."). 
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not 
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any 
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfa-
vorable testimony.8 Normally the right to confront one's ac-
cusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at 
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 
at --. In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective." Id., at -- (emphasis in 
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (ex-
cept in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' 
[of cross-examination] is required"). 
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that 
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of 
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which 
8 This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), post. We 
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only 
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial produc-
tion of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we 
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial 
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by pro-
hibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. 
See Delaware v. VanArsdall,- U. S.-,- (1986). 
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scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this 
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to dis-
credit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth 
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of 
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not 
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion in any way." -- U. S., at--. Fensterer was in full 
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Con-
frontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when 
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at 
trial on the scope of questioning. 9 
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is 
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense 
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal 
record, even though that evidence might have affected the 
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case 
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it 
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." 
9 See, e. g., Delaware v. VanArsdall, supra (denial of right to cross-
examine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness); 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real 
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (de-
nial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court nor-
mally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted 
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause 
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's 
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's 
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is ex-
clusively a trial right . . . . It does not ... require the government to 
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce 
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.") 
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it 
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have 
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daugh-
ter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all 
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. 
B 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the 
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts 
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the 
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evi-
dence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis 
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is 
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory 
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in 
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to 
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the con-
fidentiality of the files. 
1 
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of 
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most cele-
brated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, 
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. 
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled 
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a 
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production 
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 10 United States v. Burr, 
10 The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson 
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning 
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control. 
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited 
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its 
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108. 
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25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the 
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal proce-
dure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in 
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 11 More re-
cently, however, the Court has articulated some of the spe-
cific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment. 
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants 
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling 
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the deter-
mination of guilt. 12 
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity 
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce excul-
patory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require 
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally 
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under 
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley,--
U. S.- (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because 
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case 
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment prece-
dents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish 
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analy-
sis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that 
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this 
"The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an 
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932); 
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164. 
12 See, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v. 
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) 
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area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide 
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's 
claims more properly are considered by reference to due 
process. 
2 
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to 
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to 
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different termin-
ologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has 
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fense , the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley; 
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opin-
ion of WHITE, J.). 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any 
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's 
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor de-
fense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge ac-
knowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Com-
monwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is 
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file 
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would 
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in con-
fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have 
been useful to the defense. 
Although we recognize that the public interest in protect-
ing this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not 
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all 
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute 
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all 
' ,. 
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eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privi-
lege for communications between sexual assault counselors 
and victims). 13 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that 
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, 
including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature 
contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceed-
ings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all dis-
closure in criminal prosecutions. Specifically, we have no 
reason to believe that relevant information would not be dis-
closed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that 
the information is "material" to the defense of the accused. 
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further 
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file re-
viewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information that p_!obably would have changed the outcome 
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the 
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if 
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 14 
13 We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have 
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to 
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel. 
1
' The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclo-
sure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information 
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere 
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")). 
See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 869-871 
(1982). The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does 
not depend on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that 
the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a 
bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the 
nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley,-- U. S. --, -- (1985) 
(opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE, J.). 
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c 
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also 
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of 
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant, 
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court ap-
parently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that 
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate 
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the 
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in 
confidentiality. We cannot agree. 
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does 
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the 
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, supra, 
at --; United States v. Agurs, supra, at --. Although 
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in 
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the ab-
sence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant 
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the 
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the 
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request 
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it 
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed. 
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpa-
tory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's atten-
tion, 15 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. De-
fense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own 
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weather-
ford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general 
16 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time 
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence], the court may . .. enter such . .. order as it 
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constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady 
does not create one."). 
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Com-
monwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial 
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies 
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the 
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is 
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g. , the 
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the 
court, and argue in favor of its .materiality. Moreover, the 
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed 
immaterial upon original examination may become important 
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obli-
gated to release information m.aterial to the fairness of the 
trial. 
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of 
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's com-
pelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If 
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even 
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on 
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child 
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prose-
cute, in large part because there often are no witnesses ex-
cept the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt, 
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly 
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential 
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he 
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. 
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more 
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will 
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like 
all other States 16-has made a commendable effort to assure 
16 All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect 
the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. See 
Brief for State of California, et a!. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing illus-
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victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS coun-
selors without fear of general disclosure. The Common-
wealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential ma-
terial had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant 
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial 
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither 
precedent nor common sense requires such a result. 
IV 
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS 
file contains information that may have changed the outcome 
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a re-
mand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows de-
fense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review 
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without de-
stroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confiden-
tiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The 
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
trative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting 
Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458, 
508-512 (1978). 
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I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, and an opinion with respect to 
Part III-A in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, 
and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join. 
The question presented in this case is whether and to what 
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investiga-
tive files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal de-
fendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover 
favorable evidence. 
I 
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth 
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with 
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect. 
In 1979, respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape, 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corrup-
tion of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13-
year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted 
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous 
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and 
the matter then was referred to the CYS. 
During pretrial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a sub-
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ter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the 
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed 
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate re-
port by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were 
being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, 
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylva-
nia law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and 
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investiga-
tion must be kept confidential, subject to 11 specific excep-
tions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may dis-
close the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction 
pursuant to a court order." Pa. Stat. Ann. , Title 11, 
§ 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986). 
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor 
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion 
1 Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the 
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daugh-
ter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges 
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation. 
2 The statute provides in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in section 14 [Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, § 2214 
(Purdon Supp. 1986)], reports made pursuant to this act including but not 
limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . and written reports . . . as 
well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or 
X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in the possession 
of the department, a county children and youth social service agency or a 
child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made avail-
able to: 
"(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." Pa. 
Stat. Ann. , Title 11, § 2215(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986). 
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general 
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure. 
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions. 
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials 
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a per-
son who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not 
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety. 
§ 2215(c). 
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in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the in-
fonnation because the file might contain the names of favor-
able witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evi-
dence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that 
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation. 
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not exam-
ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's 
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3 
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS 
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a. 
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daugh-
ter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel 
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all as-
pects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting 
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rul-
ings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of cross-
examination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a 
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to 3 to 10 
years in prison. 
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie 
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court 
3 The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an 
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case 
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a. 
'There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given 
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its 
contents. 
5 The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the 
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
Both Clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation 
~ . ... 
85-1347-0PINION 
4 PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE 
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and ac-
cordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further 
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The 
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta-
tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he 
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to 
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only 
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS 
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available 
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to 
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated 
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the 
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the 
trial judge determined that the lack of information was preju-
dicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at 
567-568, 472 A. 2d, at 226. 
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and 
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary. 
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not 
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to 
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded 
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the en-
tire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When 
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the per-
son inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to ex-
amine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d., 
at 367, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded 
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory 
Process Clause). . 
6 The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to 
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, includ-
ing, for example, "fashioning of appropriate protective orders, or conduct-
ing certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, 368, n. 16, 502 A. 2d 
148, 153, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to 
"the right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the informa-
tion." Ibid. 
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that by denying access to the file, the trial court order had 
violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory 
Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the Com-
monwealth's argument that the trial judge already had exam-
ined the file and determined that it contained no relevant in-
formation. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity in this 
trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the 
opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the eyes and 
the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in 
places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid. 
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by 
the· Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. 476 
U. S. -- (1986). We now affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
II 
Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first 
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or 
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co . v. 
Railroad Comm'n of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945). 
Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) is not 
satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further sub-
stantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to the 
federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, Inc . 
v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues 
that under this standard the case is not final, because there 
are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania 
courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review of the 
file , and the parties will present arguments on whether the 
lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could be a 
new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the 
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these 
stages, we should decline review until these further proceed-
ings are completed. 
... - '} 
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Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the 
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we 
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which 
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions 
states that the Court may consider cases: 
"[W]here the federal claim has been finally decided, with 
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to 
come, but in which later review of the federal issue can-
not be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the 
case. . . . [I]n these cases, if the party seeking interim 
review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal 
issue will be mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, 
however, the governing state law would not permit him 
again to present his federal claims for review." I d., at 
481. 
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard be-
cause the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this 
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceed-
ings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files 
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure 
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and 
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's 
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether de-
fense counsel should have been given access will be moot. 
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Common-
wealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue 
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court 
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie 
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's 
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition. 
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have consid-
ered i: sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New 
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York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Da-
kota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983). 
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced 
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Common-
wealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court. 
On retrial Ritchie either Mll be convicted, in which case the 
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on 
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in 
which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking 
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid. ; Califor-
nia v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with 
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not con-
sider the constitutional claims now, there may well be no 
opportunity to do so in the future. 7 
7 As the dissent points out, post, at--, there is a third possibility. If 
the trial court finds prejudicial error and orders a retrial, the Common-
wealth may attempt to take an immediate appeal of this order. See Pa. 
Rule of App. Proc. 31l(a). The dissent suggests that because the Com-
monwealth can raise the Sixth Amendment issue again in this appeal, re-
spect for the finality doctrine should lead us to dismiss. But even if we 
were persuaded that an immediate appeal would lie in this situation, it 
would not necessarily follow that the constitutional issue will survive. 
The appellate court could find that the failure to disclose was harmless, 
precluding further review by the Commonwealth. Alternatively, the ap-
pellate court could agree that the error was prejudicial, thus permitting 
the Commonwealth to claim that the Sixth Amendment does not compel 
disclosure. But as the dissent recognizes, the Pennsylvania courts already 
have considered and resolved this issue in its earlier proceedings; if the 
Commonwealth were to raise it again in a new set of appeals , the courts 
below would simply reject the claim under the law of the case doctrine. 
Law of the case principles are not a bar to this Court's jurisdiction, of 
course, and thus the dissent apparently would require the Commonwealth 
to raise a fruitless Sixth Amendment claim in the trial court, the Superior 
Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still another time before we 
re-grant certiorari on the question that is now before us. 
The goals of finality would be frustrated, rather than furthered, by these 
wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual facts of 
this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine-efficiency, judicial 
restraint, and federalism, see Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 
.. I(, 
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by 
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that 
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid-
the disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur re-
gardless of the result on remand. We thus cannot agree 
with the suggestion in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that if we 
were to dismiss this case .and it was resolved on other 
grounds after disclosure of. the file, "the Commonwealth 
would not have been harmed." Post, at 2. This hardly 
could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in 
ensuring the confidentiality of CYS records. See n. 17, 
infra. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we 
have noted that "statutorily created finality requirements 
should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial 
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries 
to be suffered." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, 
n. 11 (1976). We therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case be-
fore us. 8 
U. S. 120, 124 (1945); post, at ---would be ill served by another round 
of litigation on an issue that has been authoritatively decided by the high-
est state court. 
8 Nothing in our decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971), 
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a 
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The 
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We 
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. ld., at 532. 
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid 
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties 
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" sim-
ply by refusing to comply with the subpoena. 
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy 
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for 
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an inter-
est that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately ap-
pealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party 
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the signifi-
cance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceed-
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III 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, 
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents 
of the CYS records. · The court found that this right of access 
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Com-
pulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional 
provisions in turn. 
A 
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protec-
tions for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face 
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. --, --
(1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of 
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the 
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-of-
court statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving 
ings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has 
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate 
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay, 
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue. 
Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (ex-
ceptions to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic 
waste and judicial delay). 
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action 
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth 
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sion and be held in contempt. Here we are not faced merely with an indi-
vidual's assertion that a subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a hold-
ing of a State Supreme Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality 
will not be given effect. The Commonwealth's interest in immediate re-
view of this case is obvious and substantial. Contrary to JUSTICE STE-
VENS' dissent, we do not think that the finality doctrine requires a new 
round of litigation and appellate review simply to give the Commonwealth 
"the chance to decide whether to comply with the order." Post, at 6. See 
n. 7, supra. To prolong the proceedings on this basis would be inconsist-
ent with the "pragmatic" approach we normally have taken to finality ques-
tions. See generally, Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U. S. 696, 
722-723, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic 
approach' to the question of finality'') (citation omi~ted). 
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Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475 
U. S. -- (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying 
him access to the information necessary to prepare his de-
fense, the trial court interfered with his right of cross-
examination. 
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his 
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not 
lmow which types of questions would best expose the weak-
nesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed, 
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the 
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were 
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal 
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the 
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that 
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or 
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984); 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this 
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction 
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269 
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information 
that might have made cross-examination more effective un-
dermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing 
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See 
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument, 
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In 
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from ques-
tioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record, 
because a state statute made this information presumptively 
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-exami-
nation violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's 
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile 
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis 
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when 
'' 
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a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected 
information that might be used at trial to impeach or other-
wise undermine a witness' testimony. See 509 Pa., at 
365-367, 502 A. 2d, at 152-153. 
If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the 
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a 
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. N oth-
ing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of 
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right, 
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-exami-
nation. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970) 
("[I]t is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time 
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause"); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725 
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right"). 
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not 
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any 
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfa-
vorable testimony.9 Normally the right to confront one's ac-
cusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at 
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 
at --. In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to what- V' 
ever extent, the defense might wish." I d., at -- (empha-
sis in original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 
9 This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), infra. 
We simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause 
only protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial 
production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, 
we hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a 
trial judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by 
prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise im-
proper. See Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U. S. -, - (1986). 
. "' . 
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(except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effective-
ness' [of cross-examination] is required"). 
We reaffinned this interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that 
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of 
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which 
scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this 
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to dis-
credit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth 
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of 
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not 
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion in any way." 474 U. S. , at--. Fensterer was in full 
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Con-
frontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when 
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at 
trial on the scope of questioning. 10 
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is 
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense 
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal 
'
0 See, e. g., Delaware v. VanArsdall , supra (denial of right to cross-
examine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. 
Mississippi , 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness); 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real 
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (de-
nial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court nor-
mally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted 
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare 
McCray v. Illinois , 386 U. S. 300, 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause 
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's 
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States , 353 U. S. 53 
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's 
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is ex-
clusively a 'trial right' . . . . It does not ... require the government to 
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce 
the underlying information on which its witnesses base their testimony") 
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen) . 
• 
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record, even though that evidence might have affected the 
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case 
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it 
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. " 
415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it 
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have 
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daugh-
ter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all 
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. 
B 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the 
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts 
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the 
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evi-
dence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis 
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is 
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory 
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in 
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to 
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the con-
fidentiality of the files. 
1 
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of 
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most cele-
brated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, 
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. 
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled 
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a 
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production 
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of allegedly incriminating evidence. 11 United States v. Burr, 
25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). Despite the 
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal proce-
dure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in 
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 12 More re-
cently, however, the Court has articulated some of the spe-
cific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment. 
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants 
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling 
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the deter-
mination of guilt. 13 
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity 
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce excul-
patory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require 
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally 
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under 
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley, 473 
U. S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). 
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because 
" The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson 
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning 
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control. 
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited 
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its 
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108. 
12 The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an 
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932); 
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164. 
"See, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Cool v. 
United States , 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) 
(decision based on Due Process Clause). 
' .~ t' 
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the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case 
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment prece-
dents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish 
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analy-
sis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that 
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this 
area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide 
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's 
claims more properly are considered by reference to due 
process. 
2 
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to 
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to 
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different termi-
nologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has 
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 
supra, at 682 (opinion ofBLACKMUN, J.); see id., at 685 (opin-
ion of WHITE, J.). 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any 
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's 
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor de-
fense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge ac-
knowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Com-
monwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is 
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file 
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would 
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in con-
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fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have 
been useful to the defense. 
Although we recognize that the public interest in protect-
ing this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not 
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all 
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute 
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all 
eyes. Cf. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statu-
tory privilege for communications between sexual assault 
counselors and victims). 14 Rather, the Pennsylvania law 
provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain cir-
cumstances, including when CYS is directed to do so by court 
order. Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, §2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 
1986). Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contem-
plated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we 
cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in 
criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state 
policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe 
that relevant information would not be disclosed when a 
court of competent jurisdiction determines that the informa-
tion is "material" to the defense of the accused. 
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further 
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file re-
viewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information that probably would have changed the outcome 
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the 
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if 
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 15 
''We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have 
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to 
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel. 
16 The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclo-
sure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information 
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 
•q. '' •.. 
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This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also 
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of 
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant, 
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court ap-
parently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that 
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate 
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the 
. disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in 
confidentiality. We cannot agree. 
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does 
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the 
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, 473 
U. S., at 675; United States v. Agurs , supra, at 111. Al-
though the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant 
in ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 
U. S. 855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the 
absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant 
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the 
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the 
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request 
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere 
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense")). 
Ritchie , of course, may not require the trial court to search through the 
CYS file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains ma-
terial evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 
867 (1982) ("He inust at least make some plausible showing of how their 
testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense"). 
Although the obligation to disclose exculpatory material does not depend 
on the presence of a specific request, we note that the degree of specificity 
of Ritchie's request may have a bearing on the trial court's assessment on 
remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure. See United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682-683 (1985) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). 
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U. S. 83, it is the State that decides which information must 
be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that 
other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the 
court's attention, 16 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is 
final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct 
his own search of the State's files to argue relevance. See 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is 
no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, 
and Brady did not create one"). 
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Com-
monwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial 
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies 
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the 
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is 
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g. , the 
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the 
court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the 
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed 
immaterial upon original examination may become important 
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obli-
gated to release information material to the fairness of the 
trial. 
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of 
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's com-
pelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If 
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even 
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on 
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child 
18 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16(d)(2); Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 305(E) ("If 
at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the atten-
tion of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence], the court may . . . enter such .. . 
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abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prose-
cute, in large part because there often are no witnesses ex-
cept the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt, 
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly 
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential 
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he 
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. 
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more 
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will 
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like 
all other States 17-has made a commendable effort to assure 
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS coun-
selors without fear of general disclosure. The Common-
wealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential 
material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant 
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial 
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither 
precedent nor common sense requires such a result. 
IV 
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS 
file contains information that may have changed the outcome 
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a re-
mand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows de-
fense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review 
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without de-
stroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confiden-
. tiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The 
17 The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced 
by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have statutes 
that protect the confidentiality of their official records concerning child 
abuse. See Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 
(listing illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of 
Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. 
Rev. 458, 508-512 (1978). 
,,. 
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decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Dear Lewis: 
I have taken more time than I should in getting to you 
the suggestions for changes in your circulating opinion in 
this case. I think the changes you have made for Byron meet 
some of my concerns, and I would be happy to join the 
opinion if you could make the following two additional 
changes. Change the sentence on page 15, which now reads: 
"Specifically, we have no reason 
to believe that relevant information would not 
be disclosed •••• " to read: "Jn the absence 
of any apparent state policy to the contrary, 
therefore, we have no reason to believe that 
relevant information would not be disclosed. • 
Add after the second sentence in footnote 14, page 15, but 
before the citation to Valenzuela-Bernal the following 
language: 
II 
"Ritchie, of course, may not require the trial 
court to search through the CYS file without 
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claim that it contains material evidence. See 
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 u.s. 858, 
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PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE . 
F. RITCHIE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COUR'I\ OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT 
[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. ~~  
We are a Court of limited jurisdiction. One of the basic 
limits that Congress has imposed upon us is that we may only 
review "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest 
court of a State in which a decision may be had." 28 
U. S. C. § 1257. The purposes of this restriction are obvi-
ous, and include notions of efficiency, judicial restraint, and 
federalism. See Local No. 438, Construction General La-
borers Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 550 (1963); Radio Sta-
tion WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945). Over 
the years the Court has consistently applied a strict test of 
finality to determine the reviewability of state court decisions 
remanding cases for further proceedings, and the reviewabil-
ity of pretrial discovery orders. Given the plethora of such 
decisions and orders and the fact that they often lead to the 
settlement or termination of litigation, the application of 
these strict rules has unquestionably resulted in this Court 
not reviewing countless cases that otherwise might have 
been reviewed. Despite that consequence-indeed, in my 
judgment, because of that consequence-I regard the rule as 
wise and worthy of preservation. 
I 
In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975), the 
Court recognized some limited exceptions to the general prin-
3 ? 
'-1-
, ~~·.-.-~" " /;:~ ... ~ . . , . . 
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ciple that this Court may not review cases in which further 
proceedings are anticipated in the state court. One of these 
exceptions applies "where the federal claim has been finally 
decided, with further proceedings in the state courts to come, 
but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, 
whatever the outcome of the case." ld., at 481. The con-
cern, of course, is that the petitioning party not be put in a 
position where he might eventually lose on the merits, but 
would have never had an opportunity to present his federal 
claims for review. I d. The most common example of this 
phenomenon is where a state seeks review of an appellate 
court's order that evidence be suppressed. In such a case, if 
the state were forced to proceed to trial prior to seeking 
review in this Court, it could conceivably lose its case at 
trial, and, because of the double jeopardy rule, never have a 
chance to use what we might have held to be admissible evi-
dence. See e. g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, 
n. 1 (1984). 
This case does not fit into that exception. Were we to 
decline review at this time there are three possible scenarios 
on remand. @, the Children and ~h Services (CYS) 
might refuse to produce the documents under penalty of con-
tempt, in which case appeals could be taken, and this Court 
could obtain proper jurisdiction. See United States v. Ryan, 
402 U. S. 530 (1971). ~' if CYS were to produce 
the documents, the trial court might ~d t~ error.. to be 
harmless, in which case Richie's conviction would stand and --the Commonwealth would not have been harmed by our hav-
ing OeClfried to r-eview tfie case at this stage. ~' the 
trial court could determine that Richie's lack of access to the ___....., 
documents was constitutionally prejudicial, and thus order a 
new trial. If the Commonwealth would then have no re-
course but to proceed to trial with the risk of an unreviewable 
acquittal, I agree that the Cox exception would apply. 
,;;- ~ • . h ;;-::.. ~. 
·~ · 
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Under Pennsylvania law, however, the Commonwealth 
would have the opportunity for an immediate interlocutory 
appeal of the new trial order. 
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 affords the 
Commonwealth a right to an interlocutor~ ~peal in criminal 
cases where it "clrums that the lower court committed an 
error of law." An argument that the trial court erred in 
evaluating the constitutionally harmless error issue would 
certainly qualify under that provision. 1 Moreover, the Com-
monwealth could, if necessary, reassert the constitutional ar-
guments that it now makes here. Although the claims would 
undoubtedly be rejected in Pennsylvania under the law of the 
case doctrine, this would not bar this Court from reviewing 
the claims. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 946 (1983); 
Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 261-262 (1982); see gener-
ally Stern, Gressman & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 132 
(6th ed. 1986). 
The fact that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania cannot 
irrevocably lose this case on the federal constitutional issue 
without having an opportunity to present that issue to this 
Court takes this case out of the Cox exception that the Court 
relies upon. Nonetheless, the Court now makes th~on­
ish,ing arg!lm~nt that we should hear this case now because if 
Richie's conviction is reinstated on remand, "the issue of 
'See Commonwealth v. Blevins, 453 Pa. 481, 482-483, 309 A. 2d 421, 
422 (1973) (whether "the testimony offered at trial by the Commonwealth 
was insufficient to support the jury's finding" is appealable issue of Jaw); 
Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 629, 168 A. 2d 328, 329 (1961) (cit-
ing case "where a new trial is granted to a convicted defendant on the sole 
ground that introduction of certain evidence at his trial was prejudicial 
error" as example of appealable issue of law); Commonwealth v. Durah-El, 
344 Pa. Super. 511, 514, n. 2, 496 A. 2d 1222, 1224, n. 2 (Super. Ct. 1985) 
(whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel is appeal-
able as asserted "error of law"); Commonwealth v. Carney, 310 Pa. Super. 
549, 551, n. 1, 456 A. 2d 1072, 1073, n. 1 (Super. Ct. 1983) (whether cura-
tive instruction was sufficient to remedy improper remark of prosecution 
witness is appealable as asserted "error of Jaw"). 
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~~ 
whether defense counsel should have been given access will 
be moot," and the Court will lose its chance to pass on this 
constitutional issue. Ante, at 6. This argument is wholly 
contrary to our long tradition of avoiding, not reaching out to 
decide, constitutional decisions when a case may be disposed 
of on other grounds for legitimate reasons. See Ashwander 
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 397 U. S. 288, 346-47 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Rescue Army v. Municipal 
Court, 331 U. S. 549, 571 (1947). Indeed, the Court has 
explained that it is precisely the policy against unnecessary 
constitutional adjudication that demands strict application of 
the finality requirement. Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 
334 u. s. 62, 70-71 (1948). 
II 
The Court also suggests that a reason for hearing the case 
now is that if CYS is forced to disclose the documents the 
confidentiality will be breached and subsequent review will 
·'? 
be too late. Ante, at 7-8, and n. 7. This argument fails in ~ 
light of the longstanding rule that if disclosure will, in and of  
itself, be harmful, the remedy is for the individual to decline 
to roduce the docum~ immediately appeal any con-
temp order t at 1s issued. This rule is exemplified by our 
decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971), a 
case in which a district court denied a motion to quash a sub-
poena duces tecum commanding the respondent to produce 
certain documents located in Kenya. The Court of Appeals 
held that the order was appealable but we reversed, 
explaining: 
"Respondent asserts no challenge to the continued va-
lidity of our holding in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 
U. S. 323 (1940), that one to whom a subpoena is di-
rected may not appeal the denial of a motion to quash 
that subpoena but must either obey its commands or 
refuse to do so and contest the validity of the subpoena 
if he is subsequently cited for contempt on account of his 
- ·-· - ·..1 /"' ,I ... t.-. , . / ::""_ ... 
•' . 
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failure to obey. Respondent, however, argues that 
Cobbledick does not apply in the circumstances before us 
because, he asserts, unless immediate review of the Dis-
trict Court's order is available to him, he will be forced to 
undertake a substantial burden in complying with the 
subpoena, and will therefore be 'powerless to avert the 
mischief of the order.' Perlman v. United States, 247 
u. s. 7, 13 (1918). 
"We think that respondent's assertion misapprehends 
the thrust of our cases. Of course, if he complies with 
the subpoena he will not thereafter be able to undo the 
substantial effort he has exerted in order to comply. 
But compliance is not the only course open to respond-
ent. If, as he claims, the subpoena is unduly burden-
some or otherwise unlawful, he may refuse to comply 
and litigate those questions in the event that contempt 
or similar proceedings are brought against him. Should 
his contentions be rejected at that time by the trial 
court, they will then be ripe for appellate review. But 
we have consistently held that the necessity for expe-
dition in the administration of the criminal law justifies 
putting one who seeks to resist the production of desired 
information to a choice between compliance with a trial 
court's order to produce prior to any review of that 
order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant 
possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are 
rejected on appeal. Cobbledick v. United States, supra; 
Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117 (1906); cf. 
United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 (1966); DiBella v. 
United States, 369 U. S. 121 (1962); Carroll v. United 
States, 354 U. S. 394 (1957). Only in the limited class of 
cases where denial of immediate review would render 
impossible any review whatsoever of an individual's 
claims have we allowed exceptions to this princip . ' 
I d., at 532-533. 
I 
r 
--~ . ./ ~ , ,. .. 
( . 
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In the case before us today, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has instructed the trial court to order Children and 
Youth Services (CYS) to produce certain documents for 
inspection by the trial court and respondent's counsel. 
Although compliance with the order might be burdensome for 
a different reason than the burden of obtaining documents in 
Kenya, the burden of disclosure is sufficiently troublesome to 
CYS that it apparently objects to compliance. 2 But as was 
true in the Ryan case, it has not yet been given the chance to 
decide whether to comply with the order and therefore has 
not satisfied the condition for appellate review that we had, 
until today, consistently imposed. 3 
2 It is not clear to what extent counsel for the Commonwealth in this case 
represents CYS, or whether he only represents the Office of the District 
Attorney of Allegheny County. CYS is certainly not a party to this case; 
in fact it has filed an amicus curiae brief expressing its views. That CYS 
is not a party to the case makes it all the more inappropriate for the Court 
to relax the rule of finality in order to spare CYS the need to appeal a 
contempt order if it fails to produce the documents. 
8 The Court has recognized a limited exception to this principle where 
the documents at issue are in the hands of a third party who has no inde-
pendent interest in preserving their confidentiality. See Perlman v. 
United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918); see also United States v. Ryan, 402 
U. S. 530, 533 (1971). This case presents a far different situation. As far 
as the disclosure of the documents goes, it is CYS, not the prosecutor, that 
claims a duty to preserve their confidentiality and to implement Pennsylva-
nia's Child Protective Services Law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae County 
of Allegheny, Pennsylvania on behalf of Allegheny County Children and 
Youth Services in Support of Petitioner, at 2. 
Nor does this case come within the exception of United States v. Nixon, 
418 U. S. 683, 691-692 (1974), where the Court did not require the Presi-
dent of the United States to subject himself to contempt in order to appeal 
the District Court's rejection of his assertion of executive privilege. As 
Judge Friendly explained, the rationale of that decision is unique to the 
presidency and is "wholly inapplicable" to other government agents. See 
National Super Suds, Inc v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 591 F . 2d 
174, 177 (CA21979); see also Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 726 F. 
2d 591 (CA9 1984); United States v. Winner, 641 F. 2d 825, 830 (CAlO 
1981); In re Attorney General of the United States, 596 F. 2d 58, 62 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 903 (1979); but see In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
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III 
Finally, the Court seems to rest on the rationale that)ihis ( b~ 
respondent has already been tried, immediate review in this 
particular case will expedite the termination of the litigation. 
See ante, at 7, n. 7. I am not persuaded that this is so-if 
we had not granted certiorari, the trial court might have re-
viewed the documents and found that they are harmless a 
year ago-but even if it were, the efficient enforcement of 
the finality rule precludes a case-by-case inquiry to deter-
mine whether its application is appropriate. Only by adher-
ing to our firm rules of finality can we discourage time-
consuming pieCemeal lftigatTon.-
Of course, once the case is here and has been heard, there I 
is natural reluctance to hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction. ~ 
It is misguided, however, to strain and find jurisdiction in the 
name of short-term efficiency when the long-term effect of 
the relaxation of the finality requirement will so clearly be 
inefficient. If the Court's goal is expediting the termination 
of litigation, the worst thing it can do is to extend an open-
ended invitation to litigants to interrupt state proceedings 
with interlocutory visits to this Court. 
I would therefore dismiss the writ because the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is not final. 
(Wright II), 654 F. 2d 268, 270 (CA3), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1098 (1981); 
Branch v. Phillips Petroleum, 638 F. 2d 873, 877-879 (CA5 1981) . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1347 
PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE 
F. RITCHIE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT 
[January-, 1987] 
JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether and to what 
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investiga-
tive files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal de-
fendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover 
favorable evidence. 
I 
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth 
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with 
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect. 
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape, 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corrup-
tion of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13-
year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted 
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous 
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and 
the matter then was referred to the CYS. 
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a sub-
poena, seeking access to the records concerning the daugh-
ter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the 
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed 
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate re-
port by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were 
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, 
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylva-
nia law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and 
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investiga-
tion must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific ex-
ceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may 
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pur-
suant to a court order." 11 P . S. § 2215(a)(5). 
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor 
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion 
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the in-
formation because the file might contain the names of favor-
able witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evi-
dence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that 
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation. 
Although the trial judge aclmowledged that he had not exam-
1 Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the 
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daugh-
ter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges 
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation. 
z The statute provides in part: 
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant 
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . 
and written reports ... as well as any other information obtained, reports 
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of 
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and 
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confiden-
tial and shall only be made available to: 
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a). 
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general 
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure. 
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions. 
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials 
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a per-
son who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not 
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's 
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3 
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS 
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a. 
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daugh-
ter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel 
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all as-
pects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting 
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rul-
ings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of cross-
examination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a 
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to 
ten years in prison. 
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie 
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to:rlisclose the contents of 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.S The court 
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and ac-
cordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further 
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The 
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta-
3 The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an 
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case 
before the pretrial hearing. See id. , at 68a. 
' There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given 
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its 
contents. 
5 The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the 
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation 
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory 
Process Clause). 
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he 
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to 
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only 
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS 
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available 
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to 
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated 
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the 
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the 
trial judge determined that the lack of information was preju-
dicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at --, · 
472 A. 2d, at 226. 
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and 
the case remanded to determine if a .. hew trial is necessary. 
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not 
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to 
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded 
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the en-
tire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When 
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the per-
son inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to ex-
amine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." !d., 
at --, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court con-
cluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order 
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compul-
sory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the 
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had 
examined the file and determined that it contained no rele-
8 The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to 
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, includ-
ing, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting 
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, -, n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148, 
-, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the 
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity 
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully de-
nied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the 
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see rele-
vance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid. 
In light ofthe substantial and conflicting interests held by 
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. --
U. S. --. We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and re-
mand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
II 
Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first 
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or 
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R . Co. v. 
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) 
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further 
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to 
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie ar-
gues that under this standard the case is not final, because 
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsyl-
vania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review 
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether 
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could 
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the 
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these 
stages, we should decline review until these further proceed-
ings are completed. 
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the 
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we 
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which 
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
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ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions 
states that the Court may consider cases: 
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with 
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to 
come, but in which later review of the federal issue can-
not be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [I]n 
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ulti-
mately prevails on the merits , the federal issue will be 
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the 
governing state law would not permit him again to pre-
sent his federal claims for review." !d., at 481. 
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard be-
cause the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this 
Court to review, regardless of the ol,ltcome of the proceed-
ings on remand. If the trial court de.c1des that the CYS files 
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure 
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and 
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's 
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether de-
fense counsel should have been given access will be moot. 
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Common-
wealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue 
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court 
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie 
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's 
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition. 
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have consid-
ered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Da-
kota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983). 
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced 
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Common-
wealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court. 
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the 
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on 
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in 
. , .. 
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which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking 
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid. ; Califor-
nia v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with 
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not con-
sider the constitutional claims now, there may well be no 
opportunity to do so in the future. 7 
The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by 
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that 
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid-
the disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur re-
gardless of the result on remand. We thus cannot agree 
with the suggestion in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that if we 
7 As the dissent points out, post, at--, there is a third possibility. If 
the trial court finds prejudicial error and ord.ers a retrial, the Common-
wealth may attempt to take an immediate appeal of this order. See Pa. R. 
App. P. 311. The dissent suggests that because the Commonwealth can 
raise the Sixth Amendment issue again in this appeal, respect for the final-
ity doctrine should lead us to dismiss. But even if we were persuaded that 
an immediate appeal would lie in this situation, it would not necessarily fol-
low that the constitutional issue will survive. The appellate court could 
find that the failure to disclose was harmless, precluding further review by 
the Commonwealth. Alternatively, the appellate court could agree that 
the error was prejudicial, thus permitting the Commonwealth to claim that 
the Sixth Amendment does not compel disclosure. But as the dissent rec-
ognizes, the Pennsylvania courts already have considered and resolved this 
issue in its earlier proceedings; if the Commonwealth were to raise it again 
in a new set of appeals, the courts below would simply reject the claim 
under the law of the case doctrine. Law of the case principles are not a 
bar to this Court's jurisdiction, of course, and thus the dissent apparently 
would require the Commonwealth to raise a fruitless Sixth Amendment 
claim in the trial court, the Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court still another time before we re-grant certiorari on the question that 
is now before us. 
The goals of finality would be frustrated , rather than furthered, by these 
wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual facts of 
this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine-efficiency, judicial 
restraint, and federalism, see Radio Station WOW, Inc . v. Johnson , 326 
U. S. 120, 124 (1945); post, at ---would be ill served by another round 
of litigation on an issue that has been authoritatively decided by the high-
est state court . 
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were to dismiss this case and it was resolved on other 
grounds after disclosure of the file, ''the Commonwealth 
would not have been harmed." Post, at 2. This hardly 
could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in 
ensuring the confidentiality of CYS records. See n. 17, 
infra. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we 
have noted that "statutorily created finality requirements, 
should if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial 
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries 
to be suffered." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, 
n. 11 (1976). We therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case be-
fore us. 8 
8 Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971), 
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a 
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The 
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We 
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. ld., at 532. 
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid 
the hann of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties 
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" sim-
ply by refusing to comply with the subpoena. 
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy 
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for 
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an inter-
est that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately ap-
pealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party 
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the signifi-
cance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceed-
ings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has 
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate 
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay, 
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue. 
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions 
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and 
judicial delay). 
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action 
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth 
can fonnally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci- • 
J.•( - . 
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III 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, 
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents 
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access 
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Com-
pulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional 
provisions in turn. 
A 
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protec-
tions for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face 
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, --U.S.--,--
(1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of 
the fonner right. He was not excluded from any part of the 
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-of-
court statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving 
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Iruuii, 
-- U. S. -- (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by de-
nying him access to the infonnation necessary to prepare his 
defense, the trial court interfered with his right of cross-
examination. 
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his 
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not 
sion and be held in contempt. Here we are not faced merely with an indi-
vidual's assertion that a subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a hold-
ing of a State Supreme Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality 
will not be given effect. The Commonwealth's interest in immediate re-
view of this case is obvious and substantial. Contrary to JUSTICE STE-
VENS' dissent, we do not think that the finality doctrine requires a new 
round of litigation and appellate review simply to give the Commonwealth 
"the chance to decide whether to comply with the order." Post, at 6. See 
n. 7, supra. To prolong the proceedings on this basis would be inconsist-
ent with the ''pragmatic" approach we normally have taken to finality ques-
tions. See generally, Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 
722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic ap-
proach' to the question of finality'') (citation omitted). 
" . ' 
... · .· 
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know which types of questions would best expose the weak-
nesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed, 
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the 
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were 
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal 
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the 
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that 
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or 
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984); 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this 
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction 
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269 
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information 
that might have made cross-examination more effective un-
dermines the Confrontation Clause's- purpose of increasing 
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See 
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument, 
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In 
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from ques-
tioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record, 
because a state statute made this information presumptively 
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-exami-
nation violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's 
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile 
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis 
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when 
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected 
information that might be used at trial to impeach or other-
wise undermine a witness' testimony. See -- Pa., at--, 
502 A. 2d, at 152-153. 
If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the 
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a 
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Noth-
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this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right, 
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-exami-
nation. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970) 
("[I]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time 
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725 
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right."). 
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not 
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any 
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfa-
vorable testimony.9 Normally the right to confront one's ac-
cusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at 
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 
at --. In short, the Confrontation .Clause only guarantees 
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective." ld., at -- (emphasis in 
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (ex-
cept in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' 
[of cross-examination] is required"). 
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that 
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of 
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which 
scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this 
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to dis-
credit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth 
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of 
• This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), post. We 
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only 
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial produc-
tion of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we 
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial 
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by pro-
hibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. 
See Delaware v. VanArsdall,- U. S. -,- (1986). 
Jr•r - . 
' ' 
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confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not 
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion in any way." -- U. S., at --. F ensterer was in full 
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Con-
frontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when 
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at 
trial on the scope of questioning. 10 
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is 
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense 
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal 
record, even though that evidence might have affected the 
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case 
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it 
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors . . .. . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." 
415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it 
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have 
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daugh-
10 See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, mpra (denial of right to cross-
examine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. 
Misaissippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness); 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real 
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (de-
nial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court nor-
mally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted 
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause 
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's 
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's 
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is ex-
clusively a trial right . . . . It does not ... require the government to 
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce 
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.") 
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen). 
J.•r - . 
85-1347-0PINION 
PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE 13 
ter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all 
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. 
B 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the 
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts 
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the 
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evi-
dence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis 
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is 
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory 
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in 
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to 
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the con-
fidentiality of the files. 
1 
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of 
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most cele-
brated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, 
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. 
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled 
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a 
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production 
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 11 United States v. Burr, 
25 F. Cas. 30,35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the 
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal proce-
dure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in 
11 The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson 
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning 
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control. 
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited 
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its 
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108. 
• 
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this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 12 More re-
cently, however, the Court has articulated some of the spe-
cific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment. 
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants 
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling 
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the deter-
mination of guilt. 13 
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity 
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce excul-
patory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require 
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally 
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under 
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley,--
U.S.- (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). 
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because 
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case 
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment prece-
dents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish 
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analy-
sis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that 
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this 
area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide 
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amend-
12 The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an 
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States , 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932); 
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164. 
13 See, e. g. , Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v. 
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas , 
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) 
(decision based on Due Process Clause). 
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ment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's 
claims more properly are considered by reference to due 
process. 
2 
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to 
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to 
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different termi-
nologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has 
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opin-
ion of WHITE, J.). 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any 
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's 
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor de-
fense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge ac-
lmowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Com-
monwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is 
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file 
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would 
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in con-
fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have 
been useful to the defense. 
Although we recognize that the public interest in protect-
ing this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not 
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all 
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute 
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all 
eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. §5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privi-
lege for communications between sexual assault counselors 
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and victims). 14 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that 
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, 
including when CYS is directed to do so by cgurt order. 11 
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature 
contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceed-
ings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all dis-
closure in criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any ap-
parent state policy to the contrary, we therefore have no 
reason to believe that relevant information would not be dis-
closed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that 
the information is "material" to the defense of the accused. 
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further 
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file re-
viewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information that probably would have changed the outcome 
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the 
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if 
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 15 
"We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have 
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to 
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel. 
15 The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclo-
sure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information 
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere 
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense .. . does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")). 
Ritchie, of course, may not require the trial court to search through the 
CYS file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains ma-
terial evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 
867 (1982) ("He must at least make a plausible showing how their testimony 
would have been both material and favorable to his defense"). The obliga-
tion to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does not depend on the 
presence of a specific request. We note, however, that the degree of 
specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a bearing on 
the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclo-
.. ' 
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c 
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also 
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of 
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant, 
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court ap-
parently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that 
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate 
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the 
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in 
confidentiality. We cannot agree. 
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does 
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the 
Commonwealth's files . See United States v. Bagley, supra, 
at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Although 
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in 
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the ab-
sence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant 
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the 
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the 
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request 
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it 
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed. 
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpa-
tory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's atten-
tion, 16 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. De-
fense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own 
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weather-
sure. See United States v. Bagley,- U.S.-,- (1985) (opinion 
of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at- (opinion of WHITE, J.). 
18 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time 
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ... order as it 
deems just under the circumstances.") . 
j• 
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ford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady 
does not create one."). 
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Com-
monwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial 
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies 
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the 
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is 
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g., the 
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the 
court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the 
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed 
immaterial upon original examination may become important 
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obli-
gated to release information material to the fairness of the 
trial. 
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of 
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's com-
pelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If 
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even 
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on 
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child 
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prose-
cute, in large part because there often are no witnesses ex-
cept the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt, 
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly 
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential 
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he 
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. 
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more 
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will 
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like 
all other States 17-has made a commendable effort to assure 
17 The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced 
by the fact that all 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that 
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victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS coun-
selors without fear of general disclosure. The Common-
wealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential 
material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant 
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial 
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither 
precedent nor common sense requires such a result. 
IV 
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS 
file contains information that may have changed the outcome 
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a re-
mand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows de-
fense counsel access to the CYS file. ___ An in camera review 
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without de-
stroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confiden-
tiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The 
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
protect the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. 
See Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing 
illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting 
Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458, 
508-512 (1978). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1347 
PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. 
GEORGE F. RITCHIE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
. PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT 
[February -, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether and to what 
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investiga-
tive files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal de-
fendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover 
favorable evidence. 
I 
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth 
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with 
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect. 
In 1979, respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape, 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corrup-
tion of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13-
year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted 
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous 
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and 
the matter then was referred to the CYS. 
During pretrial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a sub-
poena, seeking access to the records concerning the daugh-
ter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the 
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed 
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate re-
port by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were 
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, 
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylva-
nia law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and 
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investiga-
tion must be kept confidential, subject to 11 specific excep-
tions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may dis-
close the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction 
pursuant to a court order." Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, 
§ 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986). 
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor 
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion 
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the in-
formation because the file might contain the names of favor-
able witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evi-
dence. He als? requested disclosure of a medical report that 
1 Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the 
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daugh-
ter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges 
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation. 
2 The statute provides in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in section 14 [Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, § 2214 
(Purdon Supp. 1986)], reports made pursuant to this act including but not 
limited to report summaries of child .abuse ... and written reports .. . as 
well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or 
X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in the possession 
of the department, a county children and youth social service agency or a 
child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made avail-
able to: 
"(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." Pa. 
Stat. Ann., Title 11, § 2215(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986). 
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general 
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure. 
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions. 
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials 
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a per-
son who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not 
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety. 
§ 2215(c). 
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he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation. 
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not exam-
ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's 
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3 
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS 
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a. 
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daugh-
ter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel 
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all as-
pects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting 
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rul-
ings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of cross-
examination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a 
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to 3 to 10 
years in prison. 
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie 
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court 
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and ac-
cordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further 
3 The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an 
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case 
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a. 
• There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given 
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its 
contents. . 
5 The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the 
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
Both Clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation 
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory 
Process Clause). 
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proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The 
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta-
tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he 
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to 
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only 
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS 
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available 
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to 
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated 
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the 
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the 
trial judge determined that the lack of information was preju-
dicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at 
567-568, 472 A. 2d, at 226. 
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and 
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary. 
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not 
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to 
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded 
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the en-
tire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When 
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the per-
son inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to ex-
amine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d., 
at 367, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded 
that by denying access to the file, the trial court order had 
violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory 
Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the Com-
6 The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to 
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, includ-
ing, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders of or conduct-
ing certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, 368, n. 16, 502 A. 2d 
148, 153, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to 
"the right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the informa-
tion." Ibid. 
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monwealth's argument that the trial judge already had exam-
ined the file and determined that it contained no relevant in-
formation. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity in this 
trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the 
opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the eyes and 
the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in 
places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid. 
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by 
the Commonwealth and Ritch~e, we granted certiorari. 476 
U. S. -- (1986). We now affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
II 
Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first 
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or 
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co. v. 
Railroad Comm'n of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945). 
Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) is not 
satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further sub-
stantive proceedings before the rights ofthe parties as to the 
federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, Inc. 
v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues 
that under this standard the case is not final, because there 
are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania 
courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review of the 
file, and the parties will present arguments on whether the 
lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could be a 
new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the 
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these 
stages, we should decline review until these further proceed-
ings are completed. 
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the 
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we 
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 
I...: 4: 
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(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which 
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions 
states that the Court may consider cases: 
"[W]here the federal claim has been finally decided, with 
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to 
come, but in which later review of the federal issue can-
not be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the 
case. . . . [I]n these cases, if the party seeking interim 
review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal 
issue will be mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, 
however, the governing state law would not permit him 
again to present his federal claims for review." I d. , at 
481. 
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard be-
cause the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this 
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceed-
ings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files 
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure 
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and 
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's 
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether de-
fense counsel should have been given access will be moot. 
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Common-
wealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue 
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court 
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie 
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's 
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition. 
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have consid-
ered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Da-
kota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983). 
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced 
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Common-
wealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court. 
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On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the 
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on 
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in 
which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking 
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; Califor-
nia v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with 
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not con-
sider the constitutional claims now, there may well be no 
opportunity to do so in the future. 7 
The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decicted by 
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that 
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid-
7 As the dissent points out, post, at --, there is a third possibility. If 
the trial court finds prejudicial error and orders a retrial, the Common-
wealth may attempt to take an immediate appeal of this order. See Pa. 
Rule of App. Proc. 311. The dissent suggests that because the Common-
wealth can raise the Sixth Amendment issue again in this appeal, respect 
for the finality doctrine should lead us to dismiss. But even if we were 
persuaded that an immediate appeal would lie in this situation, it would not 
necessarily follow that the constitutional issue will survive. The appellate 
court could find that the failure to disclose was harmless, precluding fur-
ther review by the Commonwealth. Alternatively, the appellate court 
could agree that the error was prejudicial, thus permitting the Common-
wealth to claim that the Sixth Amendment does not compel disclosure. 
But as the dissent recognizes, the Pennsylvania courts already have con-
sidered and resolved this issue in its earlier proceedings; if the Common-
wealth were to raise it again in a new set of appeals, the courts below 
would simply reject the claim under the law of the case doctrine. Law of 
the case principles are not a bar to this Court's jurisdiction, of course, and 
thus the dissent apparently would require the Commonwealth to raise a 
fruitless Sixth Amendment claim in the trial court, the Superior Court, and 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still another time before we re-grant cer-
tiorari on the question that is now before us. 
The goals of finality would be frustrated, rather than furthered, by these 
wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual facts of 
this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine--efficiency, judicial 
restraint, and federalism, see Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 
U. S. 120, 124 (1945); post , at ---would be ill served by another round 
of litigation on an issue that has been authoritatively decided by the high-
est state court. 
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the disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur re-
gardless of the result on remand. We thus cannot agree 
with the suggestion in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that if we 
were to dismiss this case and it was resolved on other 
grounds after disclosure of the file, "the Commonwealth 
would not have been harmed." Post, at 2. This hardly 
could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in 
ensuring the confidentiality of CYS records. See n . 17, 
infra. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we 
have noted that "statutorily created finality requirements 
should , if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial 
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries 
to be suffered." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S . 319, 331, 
n . 11 (1976). We therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case be-
fore us.8 
8 Nothing in our decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971), 
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a 
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The 
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We 
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. Id., at 532. 
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid 
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties 
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" sim-
ply by refusing to comply with the subpoena. 
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy 
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for 
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id. , at 533, an inter-
est that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately ap-
pealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party 
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the signifi-
cance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceed-
ings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has 
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate 
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay, 
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue. 
Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (ex-
ceptions to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic 
waste and judicial delay). 
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III 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, 
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents 
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access 
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Com-
pulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional 
provisions in turn. 
A 
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protec-
tions for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face 
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S.--, --
(1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of 
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the 
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-of-
court statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving 
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475 
U. S. -- (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying 
him access to the information necessary to prepare his de-
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action 
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth 
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sion and be held in contempt. Here we are not faced merely with an indi-
vidual's assertion that a subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a hold-
ing of a State Supreme Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality 
will not be given effect. The Commonwealth's interest in immediate re-
view of this case is obvious and substantial. Contrary to JUSTICE STE-
VENS' dissent, we do not think that the finality doctrine requires a new 
round of litigation and appellate review simply to give the Commonwealth 
"the chance to decide whether to comply with the order." Post, at 6. See 
n. 7, supra. To prolong the proceedings on this basis would be inconsist-
ent with the "pragmatic" approach we normally have taken to finality ques-
tions. See generally, Bradley v. Richmond School Bd. , 416 U. S. 696, 
722-723, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic 
approach' to the question of finality") (citation omitted). 
...... 
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fense, the trial court interfered with his right of cross-
examination. . 
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his 
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not 
know which types of questions would best expose the weak-
nesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed, 
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the 
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were 
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal 
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the 
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that 
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or 
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984); 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this 
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction 
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269 
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information 
that might have made cross-examination more effective un-
dermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing 
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See 
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument, 
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In 
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from ques-
tioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record, 
because a state statute made this information presumptively 
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-exami-
nation violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's 
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile 
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis 
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when 
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected 
information that might be used at trial to impeach or other-
wise undermine a witness' testimony. See 509 Pa., at 
365-367, 502 A. 2d, at 152-153 . 
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the 
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a 
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Noth-
ing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of 
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right, 
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-exami-
nation. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970) 
("[I]t is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time 
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause"); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725 
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right"). 
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not 
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any 
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfa-
vorable testimony. 9 Normally the right to confront one's ac-
cusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at 
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 
at --. In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective." !d., at -- (emphasis in 
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (ex-
cept in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' 
[of cross-examination] is required"). 
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that 
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of 
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which 
9 This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), infra. 
We simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause 
only protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial 
production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, 
we hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a 
trial judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by 
prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise im-
proper. See Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U. S.-,- (1986). 
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scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this 
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to dis-
credit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth 
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of 
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not 
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion in any way." 474 U. S., at--. Fensterer was in full 
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Con-
frontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when 
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at 
trial on the scope of questioning. 10 
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is 
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense 
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal 
record, even though that evidence might have affected the 
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case 
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it 
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." 
10 See, e. g., Delaware v. VanArsdall, supra (denial of right to cross-
examine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. 
Mississippi , 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness); 
Smith v. Illinois , 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real 
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (de-
nial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court nor-
mally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted 
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300, 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause 
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's 
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's 
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71 , 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is ex-
clusively a 'trial right' . . . . It does not . .. require the government to 
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce 
the underlying information on which its witnesses base their testimony") 
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen). 
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it 
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have 
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daugh-
ter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all 
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose 
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. 
B 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the 
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts 
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the 
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evi-
dence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis 
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is 
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory 
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in 
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to 
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the con-
fidentiality of the files. 
1 
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of 
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most cele-
brated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, 
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. 
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled 
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a 
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production 
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 11 United States v. Burr, 
11 The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson 
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning 
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control. 
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited 
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its 
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108. 
• 
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25 F . Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). Despite the 
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal proce-
dure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in 
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 12 More re-
cently, however, the Court has articulated some of the spe-
cific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment. 
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants 
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling 
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the deter-
mination of guilt. 13 
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory 
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity 
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce excul-
patory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require 
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally 
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under 
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley, 473 
U. S. - (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). 
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because 
the applicability of the Si~th Amendment to this type of case 
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment prece-
dents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish 
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analy-
sis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that 
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this 
12 The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an 
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932); 
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164. 
13 See, e. g. , Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v. 
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas , 
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas , 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) 
(decision based on Due Process Clause). 
• 
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area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide 
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's 
claims more properly are considered by reference to due 
process. 
2 
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to 
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to 
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different termi-
nologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has 
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opin-
ion of WHITE, J.). 
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any 
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's 
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor de-
fense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge ac-
knowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Com-
monwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is 
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file 
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would 
override the Commonwealth's compelll.ng interest in con-
fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have 
been useful to the defense. 
Although we recognize that the public interest in protect-
ing this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not 
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all 
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute 
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all 
li' • 
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eyes. Cf. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statu-
tory privilege for communications between sexual assault 
counselors and victims). 14 Rather, the Pennsylvania law 
provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain cir-
cumstances, including when CYS is directed to do so by court 
order. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tilte 11, §2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 
1986). Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contem-
plated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we 
cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in 
criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state 
policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe 
that relevant information would not be disclosed when a 
court of competent jurisdiction determines that the informa-
tion is "material" to the defense of the accused. 
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further 
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file re-
viewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information that probably would have changed the outcome 
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the 
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if 
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 15 
14 We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have 
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to 
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel. 
16 The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclo-
sure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information 
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere 
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the 
defense . .. does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense")). 
Ritchie , of course, may not require the trial court to search through the 
CYS file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains ma-
terial evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 
867 (1982) ("He must at least make some plausible showing of how their 
testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense"). 
The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does not depend 
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c 
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also 
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of 
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant, 
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court ap-
parently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that 
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate 
method of assessing this -claim is to grant full access to the 
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in 
confidentiality. We cannot agree. 
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does 
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the 
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, 473 
U. S., at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Al-
though the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant 
in ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 
U. S. 855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the 
absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant 
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the 
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the 
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request 
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U. S. 83, it is the State that decides which information must 
be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that 
other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the 
court's attention, 16 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is 
on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that the degree 
of specificity of Ritchie's request for the infonnation may have a bearing on 
the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclo-
sure. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. -,- (1985) (opinion of 
BLACKMUN, J.); id., at- (opinion of WHITE, J.). 
18 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16(d)(2); Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 305(E) ("If 
at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the atten-
tion of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ... 
order as it deems just under the circumstances"). 
'1: 
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final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct 
his own search of the State's files to argue relevance. See 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is 
no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, 
and Brady did not create one"). 
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Com-
monwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial 
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies 
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the 
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is 
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g. , the 
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the 
court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the 
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed 
immaterial upon original examination may become important 
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obli-
gated to release information material to the fairness of the 
trial. 
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of 
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's com-
pelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If 
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even 
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on 
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child 
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prose-
cute, in large part because there often are no witnesses ex-
cept the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt, 
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly 
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential 
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he 
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. 
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more 
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will 
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like 
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all other States 17-has made a commendable effort to assure 
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS coun-
selors without fear of general disclosure. The Common-
wealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential 
material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant 
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial 
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither 
precedent nor common sense requires such a result. 
IV 
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS 
file contains information that may have changed the outcome 
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a re-
mand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows de-
fense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review 
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without de-
stroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confiden-
tiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The 
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
17 The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced 
by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have statutes 
that protect the confidentiality of their official records concerning child 
abuse. See Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 
(listing illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of 
Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. 
Rev. 458, 508-512 (1978). 
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This case is here from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania. It presents a question /as to the 
confidentiality of the Commonwealth's child abuse 
records. 
In Pennsylvania, there is a state agency 
entitled •children and Youth Services.• Its purpose is 
to investigate reports of child abuse, and state law 
provides that its records shall be confidential. 
Respondent was charged with sexual abuse of 
his daughter. Prior to his trial, he sought access to 
the records pertaining to his daughter, claiming that 
~~. 
they might contain exculpatory ~e. The agency 
-7 - "" 
refused to comply with the subpoena, j and the trial 
judge denied respondent's request to compe~ disclosure. 
Respondent was convicted. On appeal, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with the trial 
court. In held that under the C~nfroot~ and 
Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment,j the 
respondent - through his lawyer - was entitled~E!gr to 
trial/ to review the confidential records for purposes 
/1..4..1 ~<f_ JJ t..e_ 
of obtaining information relevant to the defense. 
1\ 
For the reasons state~ in our opinion filed 
~ 
today, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and 
2. 
remand the case for further proceedings. Respondent -
as the defendant in a criminal case - is entitled to 
,........--..> 
have the trial court determine whether the agency'~ 
fil~ontains information material to his defense. 
But we also find that respondent is not 
entitled to examine the confidential records. The 
Commonwealth has a compelling interest;fin protecting 
the confidentiality of those who provide information on 
child abuse. This is an interest that is shared by all 
50 states that have similar laws. 
We think the respondent's interest in a fair 
trial~an be protected adequately by having the trial 
judge examine the records in camera / to determine 
I 
whether - and to what extent - they contain exculpatory 
information. 
* * * 
Justice Blackmun has filed an opinion 
concurring in part/ and concurring in the judgment. 
Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion~· 
in which Justice Marshall has joined. 
3 0 
~ 
Justice Stevens has al-so filed a ·· dissenting 
/\. 
opinion / in which 
have joined. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Scalia 
Justice Stevens /and the Justices who join him/ 
conclude that the judgment below was not final for 
dc..e/. 
purposes of review. Therefore, they ee not reach the 
" merits. 
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